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Tort law responds to discrete, harmful events—“accidents”—by
converting unruly facts into a binary on/off judgment about liability.
This operation, characteristic of much of law, resembles the “thresh-
olding” process used to convert grayscale images to black and white.
It embeds decisions about how to isolate and evaluate the sample of
risk-related behavior connected to the accident. This Article focuses
on the implicit but powerful role that aggregation—of behavior,
precautions, and events—plays in the determination of liability.
These aggregative choices determine how large a slice of an injurer’s
conduct tort law will capture within its viewfinder, and how tight the
causal connection must be between the shortfalls observed there and
the accident at hand. The analysis here also sheds light on questions
of legal thresholding that emerge in other doctrinal areas.
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INTRODUCTION
Tort law deals in lumps. It responds not to the innumerable fine-
grained acts of risk creation that each of us performs every day, but
rather to large, discrete, harmful events—“accidents.”1 And it re-
sponds to those events in a binary way, converting unruly facts into
an on/off judgment about liability.2 The fact that tort law operates
at the accident level rather than at the level of risk creation pre-
sents some complications, at least if we understand tort liability as
significantly directed at providing appropriate incentives for action.3
The accident, on this view, serves as a window into risk-creating
(and risk-abating) behavior, and liability represents a rough-and-
ready way of addressing that behavior—a kind of accounting short-
cut that focuses on a realization event. How then should law isolate
and evaluate the sample of risk-related behavior connected to the
accident?
This Article provides fresh traction on this foundational question
by examining the underappreciated role of evaluative aggregation
in the liability determination. I focus on three aggregative choices:
(1) how much behavior to compile for purposes of assessing due
care;4 (2) how to stack together units of precaution in examining a
defendant’s shortfall;5 and (3) how to factor the actual or imagined
1. See, e.g., ARIEL PORAT & ALEX STEIN, TORT LIABILITY UNDER UNCERTAINTY 103-10
(2001) (contrasting liability based on risk with liability based on damage, and associating the
latter with prevailing tort law). I thank Gregory Keating for comments on the lumpiness
inherent in tort law’s harm-based approach to liability.
2. In this respect, tort law is not unique—law often has an all-or-nothing quality. See,
e.g., LEO KATZ, WHY THE LAW IS SO PERVERSE 139-56 (2011) (examining the either/or nature
of law); Adam J. Kolber, Smooth and Bumpy Laws, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 655 (2014) (analyzing
the law’s choice between continuous and discontinuous outcomes). 
3. Tort law also serves other functions, such as compensation and loss-spreading, and
can be analyzed through corrective justice and civil recourse frames that make the accident
dominant for independent reasons. The deterrence function of tort law will be my focus in this
Article, although I recognize that it may exist in some tension with other approaches and
goals.
4. See infra Part I.
5. See infra Part II.
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repetition of an interaction into liability judgments.6 These aggre-
gative choices carry decisive weight by determining how large a slice
of an injurer’s conduct tort law will capture within its viewfinder,
and how tight the causal connection must be between the shortfalls
observed there and the accident at hand.
Consider, for example, a point emphasized in work on “lapses”7 or
“compliance errors”8: It is impossible for human beings to be perfect-
ly consistent in taking precautions that must be repeated over and
over in real time, such as alertly scanning the road while driving.9
A single moment of inattention that produces an accident might be
part of a larger pattern that represents as much care as any person
could reasonably be expected to exercise.10 Alternatively, the acci-
dent-causing shortfall might be a representative draw from an urn
of chronically unreasonable conduct. Tort law does not distinguish
between these cases because it takes as the relevant unit of analysis
the single accident-causing moment, not a larger behavioral sample
that might provide corroborating or mitigating evidence about the
actor’s overall level of care.11 This does not necessarily mean that
tort law should look at broader behavioral patterns—indeed, there
are reasons to question that prescription—but it does mean that the
6. See infra Part III. Scholars have previously considered a variety of other aggregation
puzzles in tort and other law, including how to aggregate different elements of a cause of
action. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Conjunction and Aggregation, 99 MICH. L. REV. 723 (2001);
Ariel Porat & Eric A. Posner, Aggregation and Law, 122 YALE L.J. 2 (2012); see also Porat &
Posner, supra, at 9 n.8 (collecting sources touching on aggregation issues). Other works
emphasize how law isolates the factors that will be treated as legally relevant, rather than
as background conditions. See H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 33-35 (2d
ed. 1985); James M. Anderson, The Missing Theory of Variable Selection in the Economic
Analysis of Tort Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 255; Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Half-Torts, 116
YALE L.J. 1400 (2007).
7. See generally Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Lapses of Attention in Medical Malpractice
and Road Accidents, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES LAW 329 (2014). 
8. See, e.g., Mark F. Grady, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Compliance Error, 142 U. PA. L. REV.
887 (1994). 
9. See infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. 
10. For this reason, some of what the law considers negligence may not really constitute
negligence at all—at least not in the sense of representing an inefficient failure of due care.
See generally Mark F. Grady, Efficient Negligence, 87 GEO. L.J. 397 (1998). 
11. See infra Part I.A. Of course, juries may try to distinguish the cases through back-
channel ways based on inferences that they draw about the defendant’s character. See infra
note 69 and accompanying text. 
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choice to focus on a single moment in assessing negligence carries
consequences.
The consequences mount when we consider the possibility that
certain durable technologies or mechanical processes might either
substitute for or complement fast-eroding human precautions like
paying attention while driving.12 The emergence of autonomous
vehicles represents an especially salient current example. A ma-
chine with a known error rate will seem to naturally invite an
aggregate analysis, with attention focusing on whether the overall
pattern of outcomes could have been cost-effectively improved. If
not, then using the machine may appear nonnegligent, even though
the machine might hiccup now and then and cause an accident, just
as a generally cautious human might lapse. If the two cases are
treated differently, certain technologies might be overused or under-
used depending on the degree to which their deployment demands
sustained human attention.13 It is possible to address this problem
without widening tort law’s behavioral viewfinder, but doing so re-
quires recognizing the unsung role of aggregation choices in shaping
liability, and hence incentives.14
Another margin for evaluative aggregation in tort law involves
stacking together or breaking apart a set of precautionary steps that
the actor in question chose to forgo. Suppose, for example, a cricket
ball sails out of an unfenced cricket field at an altitude of seven feet
ten inches and brains a pedestrian.15 At trial, the pedestrian’s estate
shows that putting up an eight-foot fence—one high enough to have
prevented this accident—would have cost only $1000 but would
12. See infra Part I.B. Cooter and Porat focus on the possibility that liability for lapses
could lead to substitution of approaches and technologies that are less safe overall. See Cooter
& Porat, supra note 7, at 350-55. Mark Grady instead emphasizes complementarity between
durable and nondurable precautionary technologies, with advances in the former generating
increased potential for compliance errors relating to the latter. See Grady, supra note 8, at
908-09, 933-35; Mark F. Grady, Why Are People Negligent? Technology, Nondurable Pre-
cautions, and the Medical Malpractice Explosion, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 293, 330-31 (1988); see
also Cooter & Porat, supra note 7, at 353 n.54 (noting this divergence between their work and
Grady’s). 
13. See infra Part I.B. 
14. See infra Part I.C.
15. This is a standard example, prompted by the facts of Bolton v. Stone [1951] AC (HL)
[850] (Eng.). See, e.g., WARD FARNSWORTH & MARK F. GRADY, TORTS: CASES AND QUESTIONS
146-47 (2d ed. 2009); Marcel Kahan, Causation and Incentives to Take Care Under the
Negligence Rule, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 427, 428-29 (1989).
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have saved an expected $1200 in accident costs over the useful life
of the fence. This might look like an open-and-shut win for the
plaintiff, at least if the jurisdiction follows the cost-benefit approach
to negligence captured in the Hand formula.16
But not so fast. There is nothing inevitable about treating the full
eight feet of fencing as an indivisible unit when analyzing the
cricket club’s behavior. Once we disaggregate that single, lumpy, all-
or-nothing choice into incremental choices about fence heights, the
simple case starts to look less airtight. Suppose the first six feet of
fence height are really worthwhile, delivering $1100 in accident
savings while costing only $800 in lumber and labor, but the last
two feet require an extra $200 in construction costs only to save a
marginal $100 in accident costs.17 Even though it was negligent for
the cricket club not to build a six-foot fence, it would not have been
negligent for the club to stop at six feet—and a six-foot fence would
not have stopped the fateful ball. On this account, the club’s neg-
ligence (its failure to build the optimal six-foot fence) did not cause
the accident. The correct doctrinal result would seem to be no
liability.18
Yet again, not so fast. We must still consider how these aggrega-
tion decisions interact with an important architectural feature of
tort law—the fact that liability falls to zero at the point of due care
under a negligence standard.19 One implication of that architecture
has been well recognized: the possibility that a defendant would face
a behavior-distorting cliff of liability if held to account not only for
the harm that occurs because he is negligent but also for all of “the
harm that occurs when he is negligent.”20 But there is another
16. The Hand formula was famously articulated by Judge Learned Hand in United States
v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). The formula calls for comparing the
burden (B) of an untaken precaution (such as the unbuilt fence) against the expected prob-
ability of injury (P) multiplied by the expected magnitude of loss (L). See id. at 173. If B is less
than P times L, it is negligent not to undertake the precaution. See id.
17. See FARNSWORTH & GRADY, supra note 15, at 147-48 (providing similar variations on
the fence problem); see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN & CATHERINE M. SHARKEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS 175 (11th ed. 2016) (presenting similar hypotheticals that demonstrate
the problem of “choosing the correct interval for assessing defendant’s conduct”).
18. See Kahan, supra note 15, at 429 (“[A]s a matter of common law, an injurer is only
liable for accidents caused by his negligence. Therefore, the owner would not be liable for
injuries from balls flying over the fence at heights exceeding [the efficient height].”).
19. See infra Part II.B.2.
20. ROBERT D. COOTER & ARIEL PORAT, GETTING INCENTIVES RIGHT: IMPROVING TORTS,
2018] ACCIDENTS AND AGGREGATES 2377
implication of the negligence regime that has been widely ignored,
though it also bears on whether the cricket club should be let off
the hook. The law plunks a flat ledge of zero liability across the
entire range of conduct falling beyond due care—a range of conduct
that, in fact, generates different real-world accident rates.21 This
ledge also has distortive effects, and these distortions will ulti-
mately require us to reverse our earlier intuition about whether to
analytically disaggregate the unbuilt cricket fence.22 The precaution-
aggregation choice turns out to be a crucial lever for optimally
adjusting the required causal relationship between negligence and
harm.23
Finally, tort law contains some important puzzles that only
become visible when a particular interaction is repeated many times
(whether as a matter of fact or as a conceptual exercise). Deciding
whether and how to “scale up” the liability analysis constitutes
another domain for implicit aggregation choices. Repetition can
reveal distortions and injustices that are muted at the individual-
accident level—or it can do the opposite, washing out apparent a-
nomalies.24 Because statistical risks and expected payoffs become
more meaningful and tractable under large-number conditions,
results that appear intolerable at close range—a large chunk of
liability for a relatively trivial act of negligence, say—may look more
acceptable once we zoom out to capture a larger set of similar
CONTRACTS, AND RESTITUTION 26 (2014); see also id. at 17-31; Mark F. Grady, A New Positive
Economic Theory of Negligence, 92 YALE L.J. 799, 804 (1983) (referring to these two pos-
sibilities as “the P*-cutoff rule” and “the full liability rule,” respectively); Richard W. Wright,
The New Old Efficiency Theories of Causation and Liability, 7 J. TORT L. 65, 84 (2014) (re-
ferring to the harming-because-negligent rule as “the Optimal Care rule”). Put in Robert
Cooter’s terms, charging a defendant for all harm that occurs when she is negligent would im-
pose a discontinuous “sanction” for failing to exercise due care, not merely a “price” that taxes
negligent conduct at the margin. See generally Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 1523 (1984). 
21. This might seem irrelevant, given that precaution costs exceed savings in accident
costs across the entire range. But it turns out to matter under real-world conditions of
uncertainty, for reasons Mark Grady previously articulated, see generally Grady, supra note
20, and that I revisit in depth below, see infra Parts II.A-B. 
22. This conclusion follows from Grady, supra note 20, although the distortive “ledge
effect”(as I call it) does not seem to have been widely appreciated. Here, I reframe the analysis
to focus on the aggregation decision and show how it operates when decisions are chunky
rather than continuous. See infra Part II. 
23. See infra Part II.B.
24. See infra Part III.A. 
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interactions.25 Here, it becomes important to consider whether in-
surance or specialized doctrines can synthetically replicate large-
number conditions for individuals.26
Repetition may instead compound rather than counterbalance
systemic shortfalls in liability patterns. Consider the negligence of
doctors in subspecialties where patients routinely face high back-
ground risks of death. A doctor who negligently treats a population
of patients who are overwhelmingly likely to die in any event will
always be let off the hook by a more-likely-than-not standard, even
if her negligence caused, say, twenty out of one hundred observed
deaths. Although scholars have proposed various approaches to this
well-recognized problem,27 one underappreciated alternative de-
serves attention: instead of asking whether a given harm was more
likely than not caused by the doctor’s negligence, ask whether the
harm was more likely to have been caused by the doctor’s negligence
than the other harms in the conceptual set generated by repetition
of the interaction.
Here, we can take a page from “thresholding” in image manipula-
tion.28 When a grayscale image is converted into black and white, a
continuous variable (shading) must be translated, pixel by pixel,
into binary results.29 A globally applied threshold will produce
25. This point tracks one that is made in the economic literature—that problems of
lumpiness or indivisibility become less troublesome in high-volume contexts. See, e.g., KEN-
NETH J. ARROW & F.H. HAHN, GENERAL COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS 62 (1971) (noting that the
“economic significance” of indivisibilities “is relatively less when the number of units is large”
and observing that “the difference between one stamping mill and none is important, but if
the relevant choice is between 100 and 101 shovels, the assumption of divisibility is unlikely
to be seriously misleading”); HAGEN BOBZIN, INDIVISIBILITIES: MICROECONOMIC THEORY WITH
RESPECT TO INDIVISIBLE GOODS AND FACTORS 2 (1998) (“The difference between the production
of 100 000 or 100 001 cars is of little significance for an automobile company, whereas a
household faces considerable consequences depending on whether it has got a car or not.”).
26. See infra Part I.B.
27. See infra Part III.C. 
28. See, e.g., Alan C. Bovik, Basic Binary Image Processing, in HANDBOOK OF IMAGE AND
VIDEO PROCESSING 39, 39-43 (Al Bovik ed., 2d ed. 2005).
29. See id. To the extent that law similarly renders continuous variables into binaries, it
operates as a thresholding enterprise. See, e.g., KATZ, supra note 2, at 157-81 (using the
example of the legal treatment of death to illustrate the law’s reliance on binary categories);
Adam J. Kolber, Smoothing Vague Laws, in VAGUENESS AND LAW: PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 275, 281 (Geert Keil & Ralf Poscher eds., 2016) (“[W]henever we use a bumpy
law to govern a smooth phenomenon, we are rounding a continuous result to some nearby
discrete option.”). 
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unacceptable results where, for example, light or shadow falls across
a portion of the image, making all pixels in a given region darker or
lighter than the threshold that works best elsewhere in the image.30
The key to successfully picking out foreground from background is
to see which pixels are local standouts—hence, thresholding meth-
ods examine shapes, clusters, and pixel neighborhoods in order to
determine the appropriate local threshold.31 Translated into the tort
realm, this would suggest lowering the liability threshold in con-
texts with high background risk to pick out those instances that
were most likely to have been caused by the doctor’s negligence.32
All these aggregation issues arise because tort law reaches be-
havior through the narrow and hazy window of observation afforded
by the individual accident. If all instances of risk creation and miti-
gation could be perfectly tracked and priced, nothing special would
transpire when one of those acts manifested in an accident, and
there would be no need to worry about how to isolate the behavior
relevant to the accident or assess any causal connections.33 Like-
wise, the lumpiness of accidents would matter little if actors (and
their insurers) could respond to expected costs that exhibited a pre-
dictable sensitivity to changes in behavioral inputs.34 But this is ex-
actly the problem: accidents demand binary liability responses that
turn on just how the accident-relevant behavior is isolated, sliced,
and analyzed—in other words, on issues of evaluative aggregation.
30. See Robert Fisher et al., Adaptive Thresholding, HYPERMEDIA IMAGE PROCESSING
REFERENCE (2003), http://homepages.inf.ed.ac.uk/rbf/HIPR2/adpthrsh.htm [https://perma.cc/
VU24-9LAE] (describing and depicting the use of “[l]ocal adaptive thresholding” to address
situations in which “a strong illumination gradient” makes global thresholding perform poor-
ly).
31. See, e.g., Bovik, supra note 28, at 43-55 (discussing use of “region correction algo-
rithms” and related approaches to address shortcomings of thresholding); Fisher et al., supra
note 30 (describing techniques of “adaptive thresholding” that consider the local pixel neigh-
borhood in setting thresholds and allow the threshold to vary over the image accordingly). 
32. See infra Part III.C.
33. Any real-world effort at pricing risk creation would inevitably rely on imperfect
proxies, however, introducing other aggregation issues, such as those associated with
regulatory line-drawing. I thank Kimberly Ferzan for this point.
34. See Mark F. Grady, Discontinuities and Information Burdens, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
658, 659 (1988) (reviewing WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987)) (observing that the “abrupt” relationship between lapses and
liability “does not necessarily create a discontinuity in expected liability”). 
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Although this Article focuses on the way that aggregation issues
play out in the torts field, related issues of aggregation run through
all of law.35 Property scholars wrestle with the “denominator prob-
lem” in regulatory takings doctrine, which likewise requires deter-
mining the proper unit of analysis against which to assess the
impact of a particular governmental action.36 Conceptually similar
problems crop up in a variety of other fields, from constitutional
law37 to copyright38 to criminal law.39 Likewise, the broad run of leg-
islative line-drawing exercises implicitly depend on—and can stra-
tegically manipulate—aggregation decisions.40 Thus, the analysis
here carries implications for other issues involving evaluative ag-
gregation.41
The Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I focuses on the slice of
behavior used to assess negligence liability. Part II considers how
the aggregation of (untaken) precautionary steps interacts with tort
law’s liability structure. Part III examines the significance of event
repetition where uncertainty exists about causation. Part IV turns
to connections between these tort law aggregation problems and
related problems that arise in other doctrinal areas.
35. I am exploring a number of these other contexts, and the connections between them,
in a book currently in progress. LEE ANNE FENNELL, SLICES AND LUMPS: DIVISION AND AGGRE-
GATION IN LAW AND LIFE (forthcoming 2019). 
36. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992) (“Regrettably,
the rhetorical force of our ‘deprivation of all economically feasible use’ rule is greater than its
precision, since the rule does not make clear the ‘property interest’ against which the loss of
value is to be measured.”); see also infra Part IV.C. 
37. See Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J.
1311 (2002).
38. See Margot E. Kaminski & Guy A. Rub, Copyright’s Framing Problem, 64 UCLA L.
REV. 1102 (2017).
39. See Alon Harel & Ariel Porat, Aggregating Probabilities Across Cases: Criminal
Responsibility for Unspecified Offenses, 94 MINN. L. REV. 261 (2009).
40. Line-drawing sometimes occurs quite literally, as through zoning, annexation,
districting, and choosing areas for condemnation. Manipulating literal or figurative bounda-
ries to make things come out right on net offers strategic possibilities because it allows bund-
ling in negative value increments along with positive value ones, where the surplus associated
with the former is sufficient to absorb the deficits associated with the latter. See Levinson,
supra note 37, at 1326-32; see also infra Part IV.B.
41. See infra Part IV.
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I. LUMPING LAPSES
Human beings cannot avoid occasionally falling short in their ef-
forts to take due care. As Tony Honoré put it, “[I]n no activity or
walk of life can people consistently maintain the high standard of
skill and care required by law without variation.”42 Driving offers
the most familiar example. Anyone who drives very often will
experience the occasional lapse of attention.43 While usually harm-
less and quickly forgotten, these lapses sometimes produce an a-
larming near miss, and in a tragic few cases, a terrible accident.
How should these shortfalls be treated? Answering this inquiry re-
quires making aggregation choices, at least implicitly.
A. Lapses and Accidents
Two dueling concerns surround the treatment of momentary
lapses: the possibility that the observed lapse is an outlier, and the
possibility that the observed lapse is representative. The first
possibility makes liability for lapses unpalatable, while the second
possibility makes exempting them problematic.44 Both concerns are
a product of tort law’s focus on accidents rather than on risk
creation as such. Because most lapses do not eventuate in accidents,
the fact that a lapse happens to be causally connected to an accident
already makes it an outlier among lapses. That fact alone cannot be
a reason to exempt the actor from liability, at least if we wish to
retain the accident-based structure of tort liability.45 What we might
42. Tony Honoré, Responsibility and Luck, 104 LAW Q. REV. 530, 549-50 (1988); see also
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Misunderstanding Ability, Misallocating Responsibility, 68 BROOK. L.
REV. 1055, 1062 (2003) (“[P]eople’s attention often lapses in the face of monotonous, albeit
dangerous tasks. Despite tort law’s requirement of reasonableness, it is difficult to maintain
focus on a repetitive task.”). 
43. See, e.g., Grady, supra note 8, at 900 (“It is impossible to drive a car for any period of
time without missing a required precaution.”). As Grady explains, the problem can be
characterized in terms of the prohibitively high cost of achieving consistency in compliance.
See id. at 899 (“[P]eople face a cost of consistent performance that is greater than the sum of
the cost of all individual trials.”). 
44. See, e.g., Cooter & Porat, supra note 7, at 331 & n.2; see also Grady, supra note 10, at
401-02.
45. There are alternatives, such as the New Zealand system for funding recoveries by
accident victims. See generally Peter H. Schuck, Tort Reform, Kiwi-Style, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y
2382 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:2371
want to know, however, is whether the lapse is also a behavioral
outlier for this actor.
Table 1 illustrates the possibilities by dividing actors into four
categories based on their lapse frequency and accident outcomes.
Table 1. Lapse Rates and Outcomes
Commonly Lapses Rarely Lapses
Causes an Accident I II
Proceeds Uneventfully III IV
Tort law breaks the rows of Table 1 apart, but collapses the col-
umns. The requirement that risk eventuate in harm means that
only the lapsers occupying Cells I and II face potential liability. And
the law’s focus on the accident-causing moment rather than on a
larger sample of the defendant’s behavior means that Cells I and II
are treated identically.46 If actors were charged for their lapses
rather than for the accidents that they caused, Table 1’s two rows
would collapse into one, but the columns would be broken apart for
different treatment: all lapses would generate a payment obligation,
but those who rarely lapse (II and IV) would pay less often than
those who commonly lapse (I and III).
Examining a larger sample of behavior when making the neg-
ligence determination (assuming that this could be done) would also
break apart the two columns by relieving Cell II actors of liability
altogether. This would move tort law a half measure toward a risk-
based model. Yet as long as tort law’s primary distinction between
the rows persists, liability still fails to track risk creation, and luck
continues to govern individual outcomes.
Freeing Cell II lapsers from liability without any compensating
adjustments to the other cells also means that injurers in the
aggregate will face lower expected accident costs, and victims in the
REV. 187 (2008). But for purposes of the discussion here I assume that this element of the tort
framework is fixed.
46. This, at least, is the doctrinal rule. Juries may in fact “forgive” lapses that they believe
to be rare. See, e.g., Mark F. Grady, Breach of Duty 15-20 (2017) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author); see also infra note 69 and accompanying text. 
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aggregate must bear more of their own losses.47 This may seem un-
problematic if we suppose that the exempted accident-causers in
Cell II should never have been considered negligent in the first
place, so that the current legal approach is overcharging injurers as
a whole by sweeping in some nonnegligent parties along with the
negligent ones. But if so, why stop there? Surely some of the lapses
that are committed by the common lapsers in Cell I could have been
committed by even the most careful person—just not all of them.
Yet we have no way of telling an “excess” lapse from one that comes
from a human being’s unavoidable allotment, when assessing the
cause of an accident.48 If we tolerate liability for unavoidable lapses
when they are mixed in with avoidable ones committed by the same
person, why not otherwise?
Moreover, might not charging all actors for these unavoidable
lapses make up for other shortfalls of an accident-based negligence
regime? A well-known concern about the negligence standard is that
injurers will engage in risky activities to an excessive extent be-
cause they will never bear liability as long as they are sufficiently
careful—even though their elevated activity level raises accident
costs for victims.49 This activity-level problem assumes that injurers
can always comply with the negligence standard. But if lapses occur
in proportion to activity levels, then it is impossible for an injurer to
increase her activity level without also increasing her chance of be-
ing held liable for a lapse.50 Thus, liability for lapses could help to
check the tendency of injurers to overengage in risky activities by
effectively taxing (in expected-value terms) the activity in propor-
tion to its volume.51
47. Throughout the Article, I assume that victims and injurers are disjoint sets and focus
only on the precautions available to injurers. This unilateral precaution assumption, although
plainly unrealistic in many settings, simplifies the exposition to focus attention on the puzzles
of aggregation explored here.
48. Grady alludes to this problem when he observes that “[m]any slips are like so many
peas in a pod; the efficient ones look the same as the uneconomic ones.” Grady, supra note 8,
at 905-06. 
49. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 21-26 (1987). The
converse concern attaches to a strict liability regime. Here, victims are likely to engage in
excessive levels of activity, even though this raises costs for injurers. See id. at 26-32. 
50. See Grady, supra note 12, at 309 (observing that liability for compliance errors can
check activity levels). 
51. See id. (“A rule that forgave reasonable memory lapses would be much less effective
than the actual rule in controlling activity levels.”); see also Mark F. Grady, Justice Luck in
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With these points in mind, we can turn to the question of whether
the individual accident-causing moment is the right or wrong unit
of analysis upon which to base liability.52 Answering this question
requires considering both whether this is a suitable or unsuitable
way of linking liability to human behavior as an absolute matter,
and whether it introduces a distortive inconsistency in the relative
treatment of different categories of actors or actions. I will start
with the latter question, which has formed the basis for critiques of
the law’s treatment of lapses,53 before circling back to the former.54
Although I conclude that inconsistent aggregation choices can in-
deed produce distortions, there is more than one way to resolve
differences in relative treatment—and there is a reasonable case for
doing so in a way that retains the law’s current treatment of lapses.
B. Distorted Decision-Making
Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat have flagged the potential for the
legal treatment of human lapses to produce behavioral distortions,
if the law treats the shortcomings of other kinds of precautionary
technologies more leniently.55 This divergent treatment boils down
Negligence Law 20 (Feb. 12, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_ id=3124996 [https://perma.cc/33UQ-ZTGG] (observing that current law
“basically imposes a ‘stochastic tax’ on” lapses that could not be cost-effectively avoided). 
52. Grady characterizes the problem of efficient lapses as one of an insufficient period of
observation but sees practical difficulties with expanding the time scope. See, e.g., Grady,
supra note 10, at 400-02. Some of the ways that Cooter and Porat would implement a lapse
defense would effectively expand the observation period, either synthetically through prob-
abilistic reasoning or through examining repeated lapses within a particular time frame. See
COOTER & PORAT, supra note 20, at 70-72. 
53. See infra Part I.B.
54. See infra Part I.C.
55. Cooter & Porat, supra note 7, at 350-55. They also observe that activity levels will be
suppressed for lapse-prone activities that generate positive externalities. See id. at 348-50;
see also Keith N. Hylton, Duty in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
1501, 1505-10 (2006) (suggesting that liability may be calibrated in ways that account for
externalized benefits as well as externalized costs of behavior). This point is answered well
by an argument Steven Shavell has recently made in urging an expansion of the domain of
strict liability: if activities produce positive externalities, then actors should be subsidized in
accordance with those positive externalities, not relieved of liability for some set of accidents
that they produce. See Steven Shavell, Why Strict Liability Should Apply to All Dangerous
Activities—Both Common and Uncommon 37-39 (Jan. 13, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author). It would be happenstance if relief from liability happened to match up to
positive externalities, and separating out these elements allows for better incentives to take
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to differences in the aggregation of behavioral samples for evalua-
tion. Suppose, to use an example from Ward Farnsworth and Mark
Grady, that a surgeon will accidentally leave a sponge inside a
patient in one out of every one million surgeries.56 When that one-
in-a-million case occurs, the doctor will appear negligent for failing
to undertake a simple check that would have avoided a significant
risk of loss.57 Now suppose a machine can be purchased that keeps
track of sponges used in surgery and counts them as they are re-
moved. If the machine malfunctions one time per million surgeries,
should its lapse be treated the same as or differently from the lapse
of the surgeon?58
Cooter and Porat suggest that machine errors are likely to be
treated differently from human errors.59 Whereas the surgeon’s mis-
take will be evaluated in isolation by asking whether it would have
been cost effective for her to spend an extra moment ensuring that
she had all the sponges out before closing up the patient (a question
that will always be answered in the affirmative), the machine’s
error will be examined in terms of whether it would be cost effective
to design a machine that had a lower error rate (to which the an-
swer may well be negative). Although they do not put it in quite
these terms, Cooter and Porat suggest that actors may choose mech-
anized precautions that will be assessed in the aggregate over indi-
vidualized human actions that will be assessed one at a time, even
if the cost-benefit ratio is better for the human precautions than for
the mechanized precautions.60
The activity-level issue raised above only heightens the problem
that Cooter and Porat identify. A party who cannot avoid using a
technology—human judgment—that will generate actionable lapses
as she increases the volume of a given activity may indeed curtail
care along dimensions that are not well policed by the negligence system. See id. at 38. One
of those dimensions is activity levels, which liability for lapses might help control. See supra
notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
56. FARNSWORTH & GRADY, supra note 15, at 158.
57. Id. (“[I]f a surgeon mistakenly leaves a sponge inside a patient, there is no room for
him to argue that in fact he is a very careful person and that this was a once-in-a-lifetime
slipup.”).
58. See id. (asking but not answering this question). 
59. Cooter & Porat, supra note 7, at 352-53.
60. See id. at 350-55.
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her activity level.61 But a party who can substitute a mechanized
precautionary technology for a judgment-intensive approach will
have no such incentive.62 Rather, she can be certain that no matter
how high her activity level, the technology will always protect her
from liability if its overall low failure rate is deemed to meet the
due-care standard.63 Thus a driver who relies on cruise control (or,
soon, automated cars) may be able to increase the number of miles
driven without fear of expanded liability, while a driver whose own
decisions about speed or other factors will be evaluated one by one
could not do so.64
The distortion that concerns Cooter and Porat, then, is founda-
tionally a mismatch between the degree of aggregation that is em-
ployed in evaluating due care in human actions versus that which
is employed in evaluating due care in automated processes.65 They
provide examples of technologies—cruise control, traffic lights, and
so on—that generate patterns of results over time.66 Because the full
pattern can be observed, errors that would look like lapses in the
individual human actor case are not picked out and evaluated in
isolation but are instead aggregated with the far more prevalent
61. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
62. A wrinkle explored at length by Grady is the potential complementarity between tech-
nological developments and “nondurable” precautions like checking dials and instruments—
the omission of which amounts to compliance errors. See generally Grady, supra note 12.
Grady hypothesizes that these complementarities are ubiquitous and typically cause tech-
nological developments to increase rather than decrease compliance errors and associated
findings of negligence. See id. at 311-14. If all technologies involved such complementarities
and heightened risks of lapses, then the concern about substitution raised by Cooter and
Porat would not occur—instead, substitution away from new technologies would be expected
because these technologies would introduce more opportunities for human beings to fall short.
However, Grady also discusses resort to what he calls “risk dumping” technologies, which seek
to overcome or compensate for the human shortcomings that generate compliance errors. See
id. at 297-98, 309-13, 334. 
63. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., COOTER & PORAT, supra note 20, at 61-62.
65. Cooter and Porat’s concern about substitution toward machines and away from
humans is only one of the distortions that they discuss. They are also concerned with
substitution away from lapse-prone procedures toward procedures that do not invite lapses
but that are riskier overall. See id. at 69-70 (giving examples of alternative ways of delivering
babies and treating cancer). These cases can also be viewed as problems of aggregation: the
choice between procedures is a bundled one, but the choices made within a given procedure
are considered à la carte. See infra note 96. 
66. See COOTER & PORAT, supra note 20, at 61-65.
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instances of correct operation for purposes of evaluating whether the
technology meets the due-care standard.
Importantly, such technologies embed a verification function: they
ensure that we see the full universe of acts, and that we can observe
the true ratio of good outcomes to bad outcomes. The hiccup of a ma-
chine with a known error rate differs from an observed human
failing in that it is possible to immediately see—and verify—the
error’s position within a larger pattern of outcomes.67 In the case of
a human lapse, by contrast, fact-finders are observing a single draw
from an opaque urn of behavior, a single frame from an ongoing
movie that is otherwise hidden from view. Jurors will be uncertain
whether the behavior they are seeing is indeed a rare lapse, analo-
gous to the error of a generally sound machine, or whether they are
instead glimpsing one instance of an overall pattern of unreasonably
risky behavior.68 For this reason, it is perhaps unsurprising that
jurors would latch onto even legally irrelevant cues that might help
them form a judgment of the defendant’s character.69
To remove the distortion that presently exists between different
modes of precaution, Cooter and Porat recommend a kind of “lapse
defense” that would effectively permit defendants to rely on aggre-
gated information to demonstrate that they were suffering from an
atypical lapse rather than a typical shortfall.70 Taken to its logical
67. On this information problem, see, for example, Grady, supra note 12, at 306-07.
Another difference is that machines, unlike people, lack awareness of their own track record
and cannot strategically decide that they can “afford” a slip. I thank Michael Gilbert for this
point.
68. This is why, in Grady’s view, allowing a lapse defense would amount to “taking
character evidence.” Grady, supra note 10, at 402. Another concern is whether we can get good
insight into lapse rates in a manner that does not permit gaming. See id. at 401-02.
69. See Janice Nadler, Blaming as a Social Process: The Influence of Character and Moral
Emotion on Blame, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2012, at 1, 15-31 (presenting and
discussing experimental results suggesting that attributions of responsibility for harm are
sensitive to extraneous information bearing on an actor’s perceived moral character); Grady,
supra note 51, at 6-12, 19 (observing that courts allow juries to forgive lapsing defendants,
and that “the jury will look such a defendant in the eye” to decide whether forgiveness is
appropriate).
70. See COOTER & PORAT, supra note 20, at 60-73. Grady previously considered such an
approach, but appears to have largely rejected it as impractical. See Grady, supra note 10, at
401-02 (considering the possibility that “the court would expand the relevant period of time
during which the actor’s behavior is analyzed” to account for inevitable (and thus efficient)
lapses, but suggesting this would be impractical because it “essentially involves taking
character evidence, which could be extremely self-serving to the defendant”); see also Grady,
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conclusion, this would amount to a change in the unit of analysis for
assessing whether due care has been taken. It would no longer be
possible to answer that question based on observation of a one-off
event, but would instead require looking at a larger sample of
behavior. But how would this approach be implemented?
One possibility would be to focus on some facet of the defendant’s
behavior that operates at a higher level of aggregation than the
individual lapsing moment—what Cooter and Porat term “second-
order precautions.”71 Examples might include routines, plans, or
checklists that the defendant follows as standard operating proce-
dure, even if there was a shortfall on a particular occasion. Grady
has suggested that courts already tend to treat “precaution plans”
differently from individual precautions and will, for example, view
more leniently a surgeon who has adopted a plan of counting
sponges but lapses on a single occasion than a surgeon who lapses
in the absence of such a plan.72 An explicit lapse defense could build
on this approach, although it might induce wasteful expenditures on
formalizing plans that are not consistently followed or that would
perhaps even be inefficient to follow.
Another avenue for obtaining a larger sample of injurer behavior
is suggested by the immense amounts of data that smartphones can
collect (and indeed already collect). For example, some insurance
companies offer discounts to drivers who submit to smartphone-
enabled monitoring of their driving habits.73 The data collected on
risky behaviors like hard acceleration and braking, speeding, and
erratic movements currently allow premiums to better reflect risk
supra note 8, at 905 (observing that a system in which “an erring driver or surgeon could have
friends and colleagues testify that the lapse in question was reasonable given the defendant’s
normally careful habits” would carry a large administrative cost, although one that might
perhaps eventually become worth bearing); Grady, supra note 12, at 333 (“A more modest
reform would be a rule that allowed a doctor to prove that, notwithstanding his inadvertent
negligence on the occasion in question, he was maintaining a reasonable rate of compliance.”). 
71. Cooter & Porat, supra note 7.
72. See Grady, supra note 46, at 38-39.
73. See, e.g., Drivewise from Allstate, ALLSTATE INS. COMPANY, https://www.allstate.com/
drive-wise.aspx [https://perma.cc/CK6W-QWDX]; Drive Safe & Save Mobile, STATE FARM,
https://www.statefarm.com/insurance/auto/discounts/drive-safe-save/mobile-app [https://
perma.cc/L4NQ-W9CK].
2018] ACCIDENTS AND AGGREGATES 2389
profiles.74 But these data could easily be repurposed in service of a
lapse defense.75
An interesting wrinkle surrounding these new monitoring sys-
tems is their capacity to track miles driven.76 This is exactly the sort
of activity-level information that the negligence standard currently
ignores. Having it more granularly priced into insurance premiums
could improve incentives for drivers. But whether it will indeed be
properly priced into liability premiums would seem to be endoge-
nous to the legal treatment of lapses. If lapses give rise to liability,
as they do presently, then the pricing of liability premiums should
reflect the fact that any driver who drives a lot will unavoidably
lapse from time to time and may cause an accident. If a lapse de-
fense became available, however, then it would no longer be the case
that driving a great deal would translate into greater expected li-
ability due to unavoidable lapses.77 On the contrary, it might seem
that driving a large number of miles could be helpful to the lapsing
driver’s case because it would increase the base against which a
singular lapse would be assessed.
Another possibility for amassing a larger behavioral sample
might be a variation on the information-escrowing approach that
Ian Ayres and Cait Unkovic have proposed for sexual harassment
and other types of wrongdoing,78 or the “How’s My Driving” ap-
proach that Lior Strahilevitz has recommended for driving and
74. See ALLSTATE INS. COMPANY, supra note 73; STATE FARM, supra note 73.
75. Such an approach could work a hardship on those who do not own a smartphone or
are unwilling to have their every movement tracked. Submitting information about past
behavior would presumably be voluntary, but a fact-finder could draw a negative inference
if it were not supplied. 
76. See, e.g., STATE FARM, supra note 73 (“The fewer miles you drive and the safer you
drive, the more you could save on auto insurance.”).
77. The discussion in the text refers just to liability premiums (third-party insurance). We
would expect the mileage information to be priced into collision premiums (for damage to the
insured’s own car) regardless of the legal regime because this exposure exists independent of
liability judgments. Indeed, if a lapse defense were widely available, we would expect collision
premiums to be even more sensitive to miles driven because there would be fewer instances
in which another driver would be liable for the damage to the insured’s vehicle, and more time
on the road would mean more exposure to other drivers’ lapses.
78. Ian Ayres & Cait Unkovic, Information Escrows, 111 MICH. L. REV. 145 (2012). For an
earlier discussion of a similar approach inspired by the “recorder” system used in competitive
contract bridge, see Frederick Schauer & Richard Zeckhauser, On the Degree of Confidence
for Adverse Decisions, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 48-52 (1996).
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other behaviors.79 A record that is clean of complaints over an
extended period in which reporting is widely available could be used
to show that a given lapse was an aberration. Again, however, we
might worry if extensive engagement in an activity like driving were
considered an exonerating factor, given its contribution to risk
creation. Of course, miles driven could also be the basis of a Pig-
ouvian tax or similar measure designed to overcome such dis-
tortions—though this moves us a step away from an accident-centric
model.
More broadly, making current liability turn on past risk creation
would attenuate the causal relationship upon which tort law is
premised; liability would depend on risk creation over time, and not
just on how risk was created in the incident before the court. This
is not necessarily a bad thing, but it does represent a shift from a
model that relies on pairing up injurers and victims on an accident-
by-accident basis. Due care would no longer be evaluated solely
based on a defendant’s behavior toward a specific injured counter-
party, but would instead be evaluated across time based on her in-
teractions with innumerable potential counterparties. Contrary to
the standard assumptions of tort law, proof of negligence would be
found “in the air”80—or at least in the modus operandi of the
defendant.
C. A Disaggregating Alternative
There is another way to alleviate the imbalance between the law’s
treatment of human lapses and other kinds of failure rates: by
imposing strict liability for accidents caused when mechanized or
routinized systems are used to control particular operations.81 This
79. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, “How’s My Driving?” for Everyone (and Everything?), 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1699 (2006).
80. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.)
(“Proof of negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do.” (quoting FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE
LAW OF TORTS 455 (11th ed. 1920))).
81. This is how products liability already works in the context of manufacturing defects.
The individual defective product forms the unit of analysis for establishing liability, and it is
no defense that due care was taken in mass-production techniques. See John C.P. Goldberg
& Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Strict Liability in Fault and the Fault in Strict Liability, 85
FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 773-74 (2016) (analogizing the inevitable errors of mass production to
the inevitable errors of a driver or surgeon over a long enough span of time). 
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is the inverse of Cooter and Porat’s proposal. Instead of compiling
a larger sample of human behavior, the “behavior” of the machine
or procedure would be effectively disaggregated by treating each
failure as a basis for liability. This would remove the distortion as
effectively as would the creation of a lapse defense, because there
would no longer be an incentive to substitute an automated or
routine process solely for the purpose of taking advantage of eval-
uative aggregation.82 If the mechanical procedure were really su-
perior to a particular set of human decisions, however, it would still
be employed. Negligence would remain the standard for human-
mediated actions, but human lapses would still give rise to liability
in the manner that currently occurs, with the attendant (salutary)
pressure on activity levels.83
This approach raises two questions. First, can the law justify
holding people responsible for lapses that no one could possibly
avoid? Second, can the application of a nominally divergent stan-
dard for human and automated acts be justified? The key to the first
question is to see a negligence standard as a safe harbor from lia-
bility that the law extends to actors under certain instrumentally
defined circumstances,84 not an inalienable human right to inflict all
the harm on others that due care would not prevent (or even all the
harm that one cannot personally help causing). The answer to the
second question turns on the implicit role of aggregation and dis-
aggregation in evaluating care, which translates nominally diver-
gent standards into substantively equivalent ones.
To start, consider liability for human lapses, which is currently
the law,85 and which follows from the practice of evaluating each
lapse in isolation. This does mean holding actors responsible for
harm that they could not help causing—conditional on having
82. See supra text accompanying notes 59-64.
83. See Grady, supra note 12, at 309.
84. For one discussion of the implications of safe harbors in tort law, see Jason Scott
Johnston, Uncertainty, Chaos, and the Torts Process: An Economic Analysis of Legal Form,
76 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 355-56, 364 (1991). For a recent illuminating discussion of safe
harbors in general (and their converse, areas of per se liability), see generally Susan C. Morse,
Safe Harbors, Sure Shipwrecks, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1385 (2016). 
85. There are arguably some limited exceptions in the law, such as for emergencies or
certain momentary distractions. See COOTER & PORAT, supra note 20, at 63-66; Grady, supra
note 8, at 901-02. But these do not serve to generally excuse the shortfalls in attention or
forgotten precautions that plague many repetitive tasks. 
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chosen to engage in the activity in question at a given level. But
holding people responsible for shortcomings they could not prevent
is already an entrenched and pervasive feature of our negligence
regime, which does not tailor liability to match the particular abil-
ities of different actors.86 Consider the inherently clumsy person
who cannot meet the ordinary standard of reasonableness, but who
is nonetheless held liable if his clumsiness causes harm.87 As a num-
ber of scholars have noted, the law’s failure to tailor the due-care
standard introduces a “pocket of strict liability” into the negligence
system.88 Where an actor cannot reach the safe harbor of due care,
she is required to cover the (unavoidable, for her) costs of her ac-
tions.
An actor who cannot meet the standard of due care for a given
activity may therefore find herself forced, as a liability-limiting
measure, to reduce her participation in the activity or drop out of it
86. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, Personalizing Negligence Law, 91 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 627, 636 (2016) (“Current law does not personalize standards of care. It adheres,
instead, to a regime of uniform, nonpersonalized standards.”). Some limited tailoring does
occur, as for children engaged in children’s activities, but there is no general scaling of the
due-care standard to match the particular abilities of each actor. See, e.g., id. at 637-44
(discussing instances in which the law “permits some partition of the reference group against
which an actor’s behavior is judged”). The law’s approach to this question has been the subject
of some analysis and critique. See generally id. (arguing that negligence law should be
“personalized” to match individual differences in skill and riskiness); Warren F. Schwartz,
Objective and Subjective Standards of Negligence: Defining the Reasonable Person to Induce
Optimal Care and Optimal Populations of Injurers and Victims, 78 GEO. L.J. 241 (1989)
(analyzing standards of care in negligence and concluding that, despite some areas of concern,
the approaches taken by courts tend to roughly reflect trade-offs in the costs of misincentives
and of obtaining information about optimal care levels). 
87. As Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., famously put it,
If, for instance, a man is born hasty and awkward, is always having accidents
and hurting himself or his neighbors, no doubt his congenital defects will be
allowed for in the courts of Heaven, but his slips are no less troublesome to his
neighbors than if they sprang from guilty neglect. His neighbors accordingly
require him, at his proper peril, to come up to their standard, and the courts
which they establish decline to take his personal equation into account.
O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 108 (1881). 
88. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, Strict Liability in Negligence, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 271,
272 & n.6 (2012) (collecting sources on this point); Grady, supra note 8, at 896-98, 897 n.24,
898 (“In the 20 years that have elapsed since [Guido] Calabresi published The Costs of
Accidents, his theory about the pocket of strict liability has guided practically all thinking on
the subject.”); see also Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 81, at 746-48, 754-57 (discussing this
view and characterizing such unavoidable conduct as “strict liability wrongs”). 
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altogether.89 Yet unless there is some reason that people should be
encouraged to engage in certain activities at particular levels, the
fact that people will respond to a regime that holds them liable for
harms they cannot help causing by doing less of an activity or
dropping out of the activity altogether seems like a point in favor of
the approach.90 To be sure, there are instances in which the desire
for broader participation in certain activities essential to human
flourishing, or the need for children to go through a learning phase,
or the high social value associated with certain forms of inclusive-
ness, will militate in favor of tailoring. But the fact that we already
have a system that holds many actors responsible for shortfalls they
cannot help is often regarded as a functional aspect of tort law
rather than a cause for concern.91
Lapses, too, represent a way in which strains of strict liability
work their way into a negligence system.92 As already suggested, the
resulting metering effect may be desirable since the negligence sys-
tem on its own fails to effectively control activity levels.93 What
seems most problematic, I posit, is not the fact of expected liability
for lapses, but rather the high variance in individual results asso-
ciated with those lapses.94 Where insurance markets are available
89. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 86, at 242 (“When we use an objective standard to
measure the adequacy of the care taken while engaging in the activity, people who are poorly
equipped to take care exclude themselves from the activity because they view the applicable
standard of care as excessively onerous.”).
90. As Schwartz notes, it is also possible to use a subjective standard of care to screen out
those who should not participate in the activity by making the question of engagement in the
activity an explicit part of the negligence inquiry. See id. While this approach may be sensible
under some conditions, it often confronts serious information problems, including an inability
to know the value that individual actors glean from engaging in an activity, or even what
their actual activity levels were. See SHAVELL, supra note 49, at 25-26; Schwartz, supra note
86, at 279. Some of these information problems may be abating, however. See generally Ben-
Shahar & Porat, supra note 86 (discussing the role of “Big Data” in advancing a person-
alization agenda). 
91. The degree to which unattainable standards of care will induce overinvestment in
precautions by potential injurers depends on the extent to which the law imposes a “cliff
effect” at the point of due care by holding negligent actors liable for accidents that their
negligence did not cause. See Ben-Shahar & Porat, supra note 86, at 652-53. This issue is
taken up in Part II.
92. See, e.g., Grady, supra note 12, at 299-300, 307.
93. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
94. Grady notes a number of other concerns, including making defendants into insurers
of plaintiffs or forcing plaintiffs to (effectively) buy excessive amounts of insurance against
injury. See Grady, supra note 12, at 308-09, 333. 
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to translate the high-variance individual results into more predict-
able expected value “taxes” on activity levels, the results may seem
less troublesome. To be sure, we still must worry about the distor-
tive effects that Cooter and Porat identify if different preventative
technologies give rise to different levels of underlying liability, since
the mere translation of realized results into expected values does
not address that disparity.95 This brings us to the second half of the
proposed approach, which would remove this distortion by applying
strict liability to automated processes that produce errors at pre-
dictable rates.
Here, we can start by asking why an ordinary negligence stand-
ard does not already reach errors made by machines.96 The reason,
presumably, is that the machine’s errors are evaluated in the ag-
gregate (as an “error rate”) and the process is deemed to be non-
negligent so long as there is no cost-effective precaution that could
have reduced the overall loss rate. A plaintiff might attempt to
argue that the specific failure in question could have been cost-
effectively avoided by a trivial intervention had a person been pres-
ent to catch the failure. Yet a person’s presence cannot be instantly
conjured up only at the moments of failure; catching the machine’s
error would require continuous human presence throughout the
machine’s operation. If it would not have been cost effective to hire
a person for the entire running of the machine, the error could not
have been avoided in a cost-effective manner. And it seems unduly
95. See supra Part I.B.
96. A separate inquiry is why the law would not treat the decision to use the automated
process as itself negligent if it were in fact true that overall expected accident costs would be
lower with the human-mediated process (notwithstanding the lapses). Doing so would make
the machine-user liable for all harms caused by that choice. The (unsatisfying) doctrinal
answer is that the decision to use a particular technique or procedure is unlikely to be second-
guessed (especially in medical malpractice) as long as each procedure is well-accepted in the
field and meets customary standards of care. See Cooter & Porat, supra note 7, at 335-36, 353-
55; Grady, supra note 12, at 317. This means that the fixed or inherent risks associated with
a given procedure do not typically give rise to a finding of negligence, even if another pro-
cedure would have fewer of these fixed or inherent risks, and more “variable” or lapse-based
risks. Leveling the playing field in this context would require applying strict liability to
accidents that occur under the inherently riskier procedure (or, put differently, treating it as
negligent simply to have chosen the riskier procedure, given the existence of another pro-
cedure that entails less overall risk). Viewed in this light, we can understand the “automated
processes” situation as a special case of a more general problem: that the bundled choice
between procedures is typically given less scrutiny than errors that occur within procedures.
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anthropomorphic to suggest that the machine itself behaved neg-
ligently in those moments of failure.
In the case of human lapses, the same reasoning might be
attempted. For example, a driver might argue that she would ef-
fectively have to hire a “second self ” (an assistant) to watch over her
shoulder to prevent the inevitable occasional lapse, and that this
would not be cost effective. But because one’s own attention to the
task at hand is viewed as a resource that can be expanded and
contracted at will, it is assumed that one could always have paid
just a bit more attention at the time of failure—whether or not this
is realistic. Thus, in the machine case, two different lumpy precau-
tions become conceptually severable: one for a machine with a
certain error rate, and the second for a full-time human overseer.
Having invested in the first, investing in the second is not cost
justified.97 In the human case, the operator with a certain error rate
and her on-demand double-checker are believed to be embodied in
the same individual. The two lumpy precautions in the machine
case are replaced with a continuous spectrum of caretaking that is
thought to be open to the human individual as she goes about a
judgment-intensive task like driving.
Now that we see the nature of the problem, the rationale becomes
clear for moving to strict liability in the machine case while keeping
the negligence standard in place in the human-error case. The
assertion that doing so will chill innovation and thwart safety-en-
hancing moves to automation98 ignores the implicit role of evalua-
tive aggregation in determining liability outcomes. It assumes that
the human-to-machine comparison is apples to apples, when it is
really apples to orchards.99 Given the tendency toward evaluative
97. This might not always be the case; there might be some machines that perform so
poorly that adding an attendant would be cost justified. See infra Part II (examining issues
surrounding additive and substitute precautions). 
98. See, e.g., Ryan Abbott, The Reasonable Computer: Disrupting the Paradigm of Tort
Liability, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 4-5), https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=%202877380 [https://perma.cc/X45S-4LZW] (contending that
a negligence standard for human-caused injuries coupled with a strict liability standard for
computer-caused injuries “discourages automation”).
99. Cooter and Porat are, in effect, urging an orchards-to-orchards comparison—one that
would either aggregate behavior into larger patterns or look at the use of durable “second-
order precautions” designed to produce particular patterns over time. See COOTER & PORAT,
supra note 20, at 70-72; Cooter & Porat, supra note 7, at 339-48 (discussing how “second-order
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disaggregation in the human case and the tendency toward eval-
uative aggregation in the mechanized case, a (nominal) negligence
standard in the former paired with strict liability in the latter
merely levels the playing field. And it does so in a way that con-
serves on information costs because it eliminates the need to inves-
tigate the human’s overall “error rate.”
This approach dovetails with other policy considerations that
support strict liability for automated processes.100 The use of a
routinized or mechanized process suggests significant repetition of
actions and the capacity to determine in advance overall levels of
exposure. Repeat play and risk-bearing capacity are often invoked
to support strict liability, framed as enterprise liability.101 And, in
fact, the law tends to treat repeat-play enterprises carried out on a
broad scale differently from one-off activities carried out by indi-
viduals. For example, modern products liability law has evolved a
strict liability standard for manufacturing defects. Even though a
manufacturer may choose a process that has a very low error rate,
and no further cost-justified precautions are available, liability still
follows in cases of failure.102 The very predictability associated with
the low failure rate enables effective cost reduction and appropriate
choices about activity levels. The broader point is that the lumpi-
ness in outcomes associated with accidents is mediated by repeti-
tion, transforming what might in the individual case be an outlier
observation into part of a larger pattern.
precautions” can reduce the probability of a lapse and urging a “second-order reasonableness
defense” to lapses).
100. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar, Should Carmakers Be Liable When a Self-Driving Car
Crashes?, FORBES (Sept. 22, 2016, 11:36 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/omribenshahar/
2016/09/22/should-carmakers-be-liable-when-a-self-driving-car-crashes/ [https://perma.cc/
N7L2-9QCU] (offering an insurance rationale for automaker liability and suggesting that it
would not produce distortive effects).
101. See, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, Products Liability as Enterprise Liability, 10 J. TORT L.
41, 74 (2017) (“When activities are actuarilly large, the accidents that they engender will
likewise be predictable and regular, and the costs of those accidents can be factored into the
costs of conducting the enterprise.”). For historical background and a critique of enterprise
liability, see generally George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical
History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985). 
102. See, e.g., COOTER & PORAT, supra note 20, at 66; Keating, supra note 101, at 79-80.
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II. STACKING CARE
Aggregation also enters into judgments about untaken precau-
tions. Recall the example of the unfenced cricket field and the
brained pedestrian.103 An eight-foot fence—one high enough to stop
the ball—appeared cost justified when considered as a unit. But the
last two feet of the fence were not cost justified at the margin, and
the optimal six-foot fence would not have prevented the accident.
Should the defendant be able to avoid liability by demonstrating
this fact, or should the plaintiff be free to choose how to aggregate
together or break apart the precautionary steps that the defendant
failed to take?
This example presents the precaution-aggregation puzzle with
unusual clarity. The neatly stacked fence heights with known costs
and projectile-stopping properties enable us to partition the defen-
dant’s untaken precaution—the failure to build any fence at
all—into two parts: a negligent omission (failing to construct the
first six feet), and an efficient omission (failing to build beyond six
feet). Moreover, because the hypothetical states the height of the
exiting ball with certainty, it is readily apparent whether the de-
fendant’s negligent omission or merely her efficient omission was
responsible for the accident. This atypically unambiguous setup
makes the liability question appear deceptively simple.
A. Marginal Analysis and Causation
One of the most basic lessons of economics is that analysis must
be conducted “at the margin.”104 Whether you are deciding how tall
103. See supra text accompanying notes 15-18.
104. This principle, familiar from economics, turns up in some decided tort cases. See
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 99-100
(1987) (observing that the court’s analysis in Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co. (1856) 156
Eng. Rep. 1047, 1049; 11 Exch. 781, 784-85, evidenced “an implicit concern with marginal or
incremental rather than total costs of care”). As Landes and Posner explain,
The [Blyth] court was not interested in whether the total costs of burying the
main to a depth at which it would not have burst even in the unusually severe
frost of 1855 were less than the expected accident costs of the pipes’ bursting. It
was interested in whether, given that the mains had been buried to a depth that
would prevent their freezing in any ordinary frosts, the incremental expense of
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to build a fence, how many widgets to make, or how many cookies
to eat, a surefire way to get the wrong answer is to continue build-
ing, manufacturing, or eating until your total costs begin to out-
weigh your total benefits. That stopping point will be too late in any
situation where marginal costs are rising, marginal benefits are
falling, or both. Under these conditions, which are highly typical,
the first units in the sequence will have a more favorable ratio of
benefits to costs than the later units in the sequence. In making
decisions about each subsequent unit, what matters is whether the
benefits of that unit outweigh the costs of that unit.105 As soon as the
answer stops being yes, it is time to immediately stop adding units.
Continuing beyond that point will mean adding units that are more
costly than beneficial, even though it may take some time for the
deficits that they introduce to eat away the surplus of benefits over
costs associated with the earlier units and bring the total cost-ben-
efit ratio into the red.
Applying marginal analysis to our cricket case identifies the point
at which an actor who was taking due care would have ceased add-
ing height to the fence.106 In our example, that stopping point would
be six feet. Thus, it might seem like a red herring to assert that an
eight-foot fence, considered as a unit, would produce total benefits
that exceed total costs. But the fact that six feet rather than eight
feet is the correct stopping point for an actor who is exercising due
care does not, on its own, tell us what the legal response should be
to a defendant who never started building a fence at all.
It might seem axiomatic that in a negligence regime, a defendant
cannot be held liable unless her negligence caused an accident.107
That premise suggests the following two-step operation: (1) identify
the optimal fence height using marginal analysis; and (2) see if the
defendant’s failure to build a fence of that optimal height caused the
protecting against an unusually severe frost would be justified by the
incremental reduction in accident costs resulting from such an expense.
Id. at 100.
105. For a discussion of marginal analysis as it applies in legal contexts, see WARD
FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL ANALYST: A TOOLKIT FOR THINKING ABOUT THE LAW 33-35 (2007).
106. See id. (discussing the application of marginal analysis to a cricket fence example
inspired by Bolton v. Stone).
107. See, e.g., COOTER & PORAT, supra note 20, at 23 (“Under prevailing negligence law and
causation principles, liability should be imposed only for harms caused by the injurer’s
negligence.”); Kahan, supra note 15, at 428.
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accident. If not, then there should be no liability. But this analysis
embeds a questionable assumption about the respite from liability
that a negligence regime provides. On an efficiency analysis, the
shape of that respite should depend on the incentives that it pro-
duces for actors, which depend in turn on how different doctrinal
formulations interact with tort law’s specific architecture.
If we view a negligence regime not as setting the outer boundaries
for appropriately imposed liability, but rather as offering a safe har-
bor108 when a defendant has (actually) done all that might efficiently
be done to prevent an accident, the problem looks different. In other
words, it is not self-evident that a negligent defendant is entitled to
have her omissions partitioned into negligent and efficient incre-
ments when she has failed to undertake the partitioning work her-
self by exercising due care. This reframing allows us to turn to the
question of how best to minimize the costs of accidents, including
the costs of preventing accidents and of administering the system.109
The next Section takes up that inquiry. Drawing on Mark Grady’s
analysis,110 I show how the aggregation choices used in assessing
precautions represent a powerful but underappreciated way to fine-
tune tort law incentives—with surprising results for our cricket
example.
B. Unifying Untaken Precautions
In many areas of law, a defendant becomes liable only after her
behavior aggregates to a certain point or crosses a certain line—yet
once she does cross the line, her behavior is treated (without
comment) as an indivisible unit. Next to nothing separates the driv-
er who is just over the line that demarcates driving while intoxi-
cated and the driver who is just below that line. Still, a driver who
is just over the line will suffer consequences that are harsher than
could be explained by comparing her behavior’s expected social costs
with those of her trivially less intoxicated counterpart. The line, we
understand, has to be drawn somewhere—but this does not mean
108. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
109. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
26-31 (1970).
110. See generally Grady, supra note 20.
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the line-crosser is entitled to have everything below the line cleared
from her account, or to partition her intoxication into the segments
falling above and below the legal limit.111 Thus, she cannot limit her
exposure by demonstrating that she would have driven almost as
badly had she not taken the last sip that put her over the legal lim-
it. Having actually crossed the line, she forfeits the protective bene-
fits the line otherwise would have afforded to her below-threshold
conduct.112
In the drunk driving context, as in other criminal contexts, we
may tolerate or even welcome a cliff effect in order to get meaning-
ful deterrence. To use Robert Cooter’s distinction, “sanctions” seem
more appropriate than mere “prices.”113 Tort law is different in that
there are significant social costs to overshooting as well as under-
shooting due care. But even when a price (and not a sanction) is
what we seek, that price still must be set appropriately. For reasons
to be explained below, permitting defendants to partition an un-
taken precaution identified by plaintiffs into negligent and non-
negligent omissions would apply a distortive discount to the tort
system’s pricing mechanism. To see why, we must first step back to
examine how a negligence regime operates.
1. Negligent Defendants and Efficient Accidents
Unpacking the cricket fence problem first requires pinpointing
the essential difference between negligence and strict liability. The
two approaches differ in their treatment of accidents that happen
even though everyone is exercising due care. To prevent all acci-
dents would require a level of precaution that would cost society far
more than it would be worth.114 This is why we do not set all speed
111. Indeed, if asked to articulate what the drunk driver did wrong, we would probably say
something like, “downing three beers in quick succession and then getting behind the wheel,”
not “driving after taking the tiny sip that put her blood alcohol level over the legal limit.” 
112. This result is not inevitable. The law could be made more continuous in its effects by
punishing people only for the marginal impacts of their over-the-limit conduct. See Kolber,
supra note 29, at 293 (“If one is especially concerned about the horizontal inequity of giving
the slightly less culpable no punishment at all, we could eliminate the inequity simply by
punishing all offenders only to the extent that their conduct exceeds the threshold.”). But the
fact that this is not how law usually operates remains suggestive. See also infra Part IV.C.
113. See generally Cooter, supra note 20. 
114. See generally CALABRESI, supra note 109.
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limits at ten miles per hour, require cars to be built like tanks, or
mandate the wearing of body armor at all times.115 The costs of “effi-
cient accidents”116—those that occur even when everyone is being as
careful as it makes sense to be—must fall on someone. Negligence
law leaves these costs to fall on the victims, while strict liability as-
signs the losses from these efficient accidents to the injurer.117 When
an injurer in a negligence regime falls short of due care, however,
she exposes herself to liability. But how much liability?
To return to our example above, should the cricket club that has
negligently failed to build any fence at all be liable for the harm
caused by all balls that leave the field (regardless of altitude), only
those errant balls that would have been stopped by an optimal six-
foot fence, or some group of escaping orbs in between these two al-
ternatives? The academic literature on this topic notes correctly that
the first alternative, which we might call the “harming while neg-
ligent” (HWN) approach, creates a cliff of liability118—fall one iota
short of due care and all bets are off ! Under this approach, the actor
would face liability for the efficient accidents that otherwise would
have been charged to the victim, as well as the ones that the actor’s
negligence itself actually caused. Such a discontinuity puts a great
deal of pressure on actors to make sure they meet the due-care
115. See GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW: PRIVATE LAW PER-
SPECTIVES ON A PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM 9 (1985) (using the example of cars “built like tanks”
that “cannot go faster than ten miles per hour” to emphasize that the costs of safety can some-
times be unacceptably large). 
116. See, e.g., Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 269 (1974) (referring to “nonnegligent” accidents as
“efficient” ones). Accidents that could not have been prevented through the exercise of due
care are often referred to in the legal literature as “unavoidable,” but this is a misnomer. See
Grady, supra note 8, at 910 n.73 (describing this usage and observing that “most unavoidable
accidents can indeed be avoided, but at excessive cost”). “Efficient accidents,” while closer to
the mark, is potentially misleading as well. Some of the means through which these accidents
might be reduced, such as curtailing activity levels, do not get picked up in standard due-care
analyses but might be efficient for actors to undertake; if so, the accidents thus avoided would
not have been “efficient” ones, even though “due care” (as standardly understood) could not
have prevented them.
117. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 208-09
(1973).
118. See, e.g., COOTER & PORAT, supra note 20, at 21; see also supra note 20 and accom-
panying text.
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standard; it imposes a sanction, and not a mere price, on falling
short.119
Yet it seems doctrinally wrong. Surely the cricket club should not
be liable in a negligence regime for a freak cricket ball that flies out
of the field at an altitude of sixty feet since no reasonable fence
could have stopped it from happening. And, in fact, it appears that
courts do not impose liability on negligent actors when it is clear
that behaving with due care would not have kept the accident from
happening.120 This does not mean defendants always benefit from a
surgical separation of negligent omissions and efficient omissions.
On the contrary, two kinds of uncertainty allow those categories to
be routinely blurred together. One is uncertainty about which
increment of the defendant’s omission caused the harm. Often, the
negligent portion of the defendant’s conduct caused the harm with
some positive probability but not with certainty, as will be discussed
below.121 For now, it is sufficient to observe that this form of factual
uncertainty likely causes negligent defendants to be liable for more
harm than would be statistically associated with their negligent
omissions alone.122
A second source of uncertainty concerns the position of the due-
care standard, which marks the dividing line between a defendant’s
negligent omissions and her efficient omissions. In many cases, it
will be evident that a defendant’s conduct fell below any plausible
standard of due care, yet remain unclear exactly how much more
was necessary to achieve due care. Here, we might expect a sys-
tematic skew in the direction of liability, especially if due care is
evaluated in a manner endogenous to the choices the defendant
119. See Cooter, supra note 20, at 1538-39.
120. See Wright, supra note 20, at 84 (“[T]he decisions of the courts ... have consistently
limited negligence liability to injuries that were caused by the negligent aspect of the injurer’s
activity.”); see also COOTER & PORAT, supra note 20, at 23-25 (distinguishing cases of perfect
and imperfect causal attribution).
121. See infra Part III.
122. It is possible that factual uncertainty about causation is resolved symmetrically. See
Kahan, supra note 15, at 442 (considering the possibility that finders of fact might “semi-
automatically” find causation once negligence was established, but finding it “also plausible
to assume that some fact finders resolve these difficult questions in the favor of injurers”). The
question is an empirical one, but it seems likely that a fact-finder will err on the side of
liability when faced with a plainly harmed plaintiff, a plainly negligent defendant, and factual
uncertainty running only to which facet of the defendant’s conduct produced the harm. See
infra Part III.
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actually made about precautions. In the absence of a clear external
standard for due care (such as a speed limit), attention tends to
focus on “the untaken precaution”—the content of which depends on
what the defendant actually did.123 The cricket hypothetical enables
us to observe this potential for endogeneity at close range and
evaluate whether it represents a feature or a bug.
The balance of this Section considers how to approach the liability
of negligent defendants where marginal analysis establishes that
taking due care would not have prevented the harm in question. The
HWN standard discussed above will be compared with a “harming
because negligent” (HBN) approach, as well as with a hybrid al-
ternative falling between these extremes—what Mark Grady calls
a “cost-benefit rule,”124 and which I will refer to here as the “unified
untaken precaution” (UUP) rule.
2. Cliffs and Ledges
Consider a rule that would limit the defendant’s liability to those
accidents that were actually caused by her negligence—in other
words, an HBN regime. Such an approach eliminates the cliff of
liability that can confront defendants who fall just a little short of
due care under an HWN approach. To be sure, the cliff provides a
powerful incentive to reach the requisite level of due care, and per-
fectly informed and rational actors would simply meet that standard
without fail. But actors who are uncertain about the location of the
due-care standard (or who fear mistakes by fact-finders) may take
excessive care in an effort to avoid disproportionately harsh results
stemming from relatively minor shortfalls (or perceived short-
falls).125
Yet the HBN alternative leaves in place a ledge that also proves
problematic: liability sits at zero for all harms that due care would
123. See Mark F. Grady, Untaken Precautions, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 143 (1989) (“[Courts]
take the plaintiff’s allegations of the untaken precautions of the defendant and ask, in light
of the precautions that had been taken, whether some particular precaution promised benefits
(in accident reduction) greater than its associated costs.”). A failure of due care may also be
inferred from the fact of the accident in some cases, following the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
See id. at 141 & n.7 (collecting literature).
124. See Grady, supra note 20, at 814-21 (describing and depicting this approach).
125. See, e.g., id. at 806-12.
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not prevent. Not only is an actor who failed to exercise due care
excused from the costs associated with the accidents that due care
would not prevent, an actor who goes beyond due care gets no
further credit for reducing these accident costs.126 There is, at the
point of due care, a sharp drop-off (to zero) in the private returns
that the actor internalizes from taking more increments of care,
even though the societal benefits associated with those added in-
crements of care may remain quite significant.127 That discontinu-
ity—what we might call a ledge effect—matters too.128 Uncertainties
that present difficulties for the HWN regime reemerge here to
generate drawbacks for the HBN approach, as Grady has carefully
demonstrated.129
Consider an actor like the cricket club that must decide whether
to err on the side of going above or falling below due care, where
there is uncertainty about exactly how a court will evaluate its
conduct.130 The club’s owner has to shell out money for each
126. The fact that due care has been reached does not mean that no further reductions in
accident costs are possible; it simply means that those reductions cost more than they are
worth. Although the lack of net social value associated with these further accident reductions
means that they should not be undertaken in a world of perfect information, they nonetheless
matter when an actor must decide whether to err on the side of more or fewer precautions.
See id.
127. This can be readily demonstrated by considering a case where risks and precautions
are perfectly continuous. As the actor approaches the level of due care, she spends $1.00 to
gain $1.01 in accident reduction benefits and should stop when the marginal costs equal the
marginal benefits (spending $1.00 to save $1.00). If she goes $1.00 further, accident costs fall
by $0.99, but she internalizes none of those social gains. Her liability is zero whether she
spends the extra dollar or not. What is from society’s standpoint an overexpenditure that costs
just one penny (net) is from the actor’s perspective an error that costs a full dollar because she
gets nothing in return. 
128. Although Grady’s analysis does not put matters in quite these terms, his graphical
representation of the operation of his P*-cutoff rule illustrates this discontinuity. See Grady,
supra note 20, at 812-13, 813 fig.3 (showing that the costs internalized to the actor rise sharp-
ly as she moves past the point of due care, P*, creating an asymmetry with her cost profile be-
fore reaching due care). 
129. See id. at 801-06, 802 fig.1, 812-13, 813 fig.3. 
130. See id. at 806-21 (analyzing and depicting the choice between underprecaution and
overprecaution, given uncertainty, under different legal rules). Significantly, this uncertainty
is the primary reason why the HBN versus HWN choice matters. In the absence of such
uncertainty, the actor would simply comply with due care, and that would be that. See id. at
806-09. Of course, all actors experience some inevitable lapses, and some actors cannot meet
the due-care standard easily or at all. For these reasons, a negligence standard already
inserts an element of strict liability—one that the HWN regime would exacerbate. See supra
notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
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increment of fencing height. If she builds too high, she will be
wasting her money; her liability is already at zero once due care is
achieved, and she receives no credit for going further. If she builds
too low, however, she will save on fencing costs and will expose
herself only to the incremental accident costs associated with the
amount by which she fell short. As a result, mistakes in the di-
rection of too much care will cost her more than mistakes in the di-
rection of too little care.131 Thus, actors in an HBN regime may be
inclined to err on the side of stopping short of due care.
A numeric example will clarify. Suppose the schedule of marginal
costs and benefits for increasing fence heights between five and
eight feet is as shown in Table 2.

















from 7 to 8
feet
100 0 25
Here, due care under the Hand formula132 requires building to, but
not above, six feet (assuming that only integer fences are possible).
Beyond that point, construction costs exceed savings in accident
costs.
Now consider the problem from the viewpoint of a cricket club in
an HBN regime that is uncertain ex ante what fence height will be
judged optimal. An upward deviation from the optimal six-foot fence
131. For a graphical demonstration of this point, see Grady, supra note 20, at 812-13, 813
fig.3; see also id. at 801-06, 802 fig.1. 
132. See supra note 16.
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to a seven-foot fence will cost the cricket club an extra $100 in con-
struction costs but will not save it anything in accident costs since
liability is already sitting at zero. So it loses $100 on net by guessing
too high about the standard of care. A downward deviation from the
optimal six-foot fence to a five-foot fence will mean bearing an extra
$175 in expected accident costs, but it will also mean saving $100 in
construction costs. The net cost of guessing too low is just $75. The
actor will, therefore, err on the side of too little precaution.
From society’s standpoint, the calculation looks different. The cost
of the upward mistake is just $25. Even though an extra $100 is
spent on construction, there is a $75 savings in accident costs to
help offset it. The downward mistake, on the other hand, costs
society the full $75 that it costs the actor. On these numbers, society
would prefer that the actor make the upward mistake rather than
the downward mistake.133 Of course, a downward mistake will not
invariably be more costly than an upward mistake—that will de-
pend on the specific profile of costs and benefits associated with the
available changes in fence heights.134 The important point is that
the ledge effect baked into the negligence standard will cause in-
jurers’ errors to skew low under an HBN rule, rather than center on
the optimal point.135
Compare next the calculation the club owner would make under
an HWN standard that makes a negligent actor liable for all injur-
ing balls, regardless of altitude. Now, she will choose to overshoot
rather than undershoot due care.136 If she builds to only five feet,
she will be liable not just for the $175 in expected costs for the
133. Of course, society would prefer that the actor stop at exactly the level of due care,
since going further costs more in precaution than it saves in accident costs. But if a mistake
is to be made, it would prefer the less costly of the two. 
134. The two types of errors (undershooting and overshooting) are equally socially costly,
but the magnitudes of these mistakes may differ in a given setting, owing to factors like
lumpiness in precautionary technologies. Here, the fact that fences come only in integer
heights—one cannot add just a few inches—makes fencing precautions lumpy. In some cases,
lumpiness in precautionary alternatives will actually help to remove distortions in decision-
making by producing greater convergence between the privately optimal strategy and the
socially optimal strategy, while in other cases it does the opposite. See Lee Anne Fennell,
Slicing Spontaneity, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2365, 2377-82 (2015). None of this changes the fact that
an HBN regime has a tendency to make precautions skew low, but lumpiness in precau-
tionary steps can ameliorate or exacerbate the effects of that tendency in certain cases.
135. See Grady, supra note 20, at 812-13, 813 fig.3.
136. See id. at 809-12, 810 fig.2.
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increment in between five feet and six feet, but also the accidents
that occur when balls exit the field at seven, eight, and sixty feet
(and all other heights). This means she will also be on the hook for
the additional $75 in expected costs that would have been saved by
the six-foot to seven-foot increment, the additional $25 in expected
costs associated with balls exiting in the seven-foot to eight-foot
range, and all the costs for balls higher than that. To save $100 in
construction costs, she exposes herself to at least $275 in liability,
or a net cost of $175 or more. Making a mistake in the other direc-
tion and building to seven feet is less costly in this regime. True, she
spends $100 more on construction and does not get any benefit from
society’s $75 in cost savings. But a $100 mistake is cheaper than a
$175 mistake.
Grady’s analysis makes the case for an intermediate alternative,
one that he suggests hews most closely to what courts actually do.137
This approach would impose liability on a negligent defendant only
when the plaintiff can identify an untaken precaution that satisfies
two criteria: (1) it would have prevented the accident; and (2) taken
as a whole, the precaution’s benefits in terms of accident reduction
exceed its costs.138 In short, the precaution (considered as a unit)
must be both causally effective and cost effective. Under such a
regime, liability would follow in the hypothetical where the cricket
club constructed no fence at all, the ball sailed out at just under
eight feet, and the eight-foot fence, taken as a whole, would have
been cost justified. Because this approach relies on artificially
“unifying” the untaken precaution for purposes of evaluating neg-
ligence liability, I call it the “unified untaken precaution” (UUP)
rule.
The workings of this rule can be explained intuitively. To be
incentivized to dead-center her behavior on due care, an actor must
bear equivalent costs for overshooting due care and undershooting
137. Id. at 814-29 (describing his “cost-benefit” approach).
138. See id. at 815 (explaining that under his approach, courts would “find an injurer
negligent whenever the costs of at least one specific untaken precaution are less than the
reduction in expected harm that would have resulted from that precaution” and “would then
impose liability if the specific act of negligence used to prove the breach of duty was the cause
in fact of the harm the victims suffered”); Grady, supra note 34, at 673 (describing the cost-
benefit analysis and the causal inquiry as “two different rings of fire” that a proposed untaken
precaution must clear). 
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due care. But in an HBN regime, as we have seen, an actor bears
more costs than society does when she overshoots due care, but the
same costs as society does when she undershoots due care. The
actor’s liability is zero across the whole range of conduct above the
due-care line, so every penny she spends on excess precaution buys
her no benefits at all, even though it does still buy society additional
benefits (albeit ones that are not worth their full cost). This diver-
gence between the cost of the overshooting mistake for society and
its cost for the actor herself will create a skew in the direction of in-
sufficient care under an HBN regime.
To correct that skew requires increasing the costs that attach to
undershooting due care just enough that the actor is left indifferent
between overshooting and undershooting.139 The HWN approach
cannot accomplish this sensitive task. Instead, it bluntly overcor-
rects with a cliff of unlimited liability that creates a skew in the
opposite direction, toward too much care. Under an HWN rule,
anyone who falls even a little short of due care will be liable for any
accidents she causes. The UUP approach, by contrast, makes the
degree of extra exposure added to undershooting errors dependent
on the degree to which the actor undershot due care.140 This is
accomplished by allowing a victim to specify—and, crucially, treat
as an indivisible unit—any untaken precaution that meets the
criteria of cost effectiveness and causal effectiveness.141
When an injurer has been negligent, such a qualifying untaken
precaution can extend beyond the point of due care.142 By treating
the proffered untaken precaution as a single unit, a court is effec-
tively comparing the precaution’s total costs with its total bene-
fits.143 As we saw above, total benefits can continue to exceed total
costs well beyond the optimal stopping point on a marginal analysis,
139. Alternatively, were it possible, society could rebate to the actor the accident cost
savings associated with overshooting due care. 
140. See Grady, supra note 20, at 815-16.
141. See id. at 815-17.
142. See Grady, supra note 34, at 661 (“Untaken precautions beyond the efficient set
appear cost-beneficial only when the injurer has used less precaution than due care.”). 
143. To be clear, the court is examining the marginal cost of the precaution as a whole with
the marginal benefit of the precaution as a whole. But the marginal steps contained within
the envelope of “the precaution” are ignored, as are any marginal differences between a lesser
precaution and the proffered one. See id. at 670-71 (distinguishing “marginal analysis” from
a cost-benefit assessment of “discrete untaken precautions”).
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because the surpluses from the earlier (efficient) units subsidize the
deficits in the later (inefficient) units.144 Still, the requirement of
cost effectiveness provides an important constraint: the actor can be
held liable for untaken precautions that exceed due care, but only
to the extent of the surplus of benefits over costs associated with the
untaken increments that actually fall short of due care.145 The larger
the defendant’s error, the more socially costly her shortfall, the
greater the potential for liability for untaken precautions extending
beyond due care.146
Under certain assumptions, including perfect linearity, the UUP
approach adds consequences to the insufficient care side of the line
that exactly make up for the gap between social costs and private
costs on the excessive care side of the line.147 But even under more
realistic conditions where precautions are lumpy and their effects
nonlinear, the UUP approach is likely to outperform the other al-
ternatives. Unlike in a pure HBN regime, a negligent defendant is
not allowed to partition her omissions into negligent and nonneg-
ligent components when a qualifying untaken precaution can be
identified that spans the two categories. But, unlike HWN, the UUP
approach does not generate an unlimited cliff of liability. The pe-
destrian struck by a ball exiting the field at a height of sixty feet has
no claim because a sixty-foot fence would not be worth its cost, even
when considered as a unit and compared with nothing at all.
Instead, as Grady’s elegant graphical representations of this point
demonstrate, a plaintiff ’s ability to identify an untaken precaution
that exhibits both cost effectiveness and causal effectiveness de-
pends crucially on what the defendant has done and failed to do.148
144. See supra Part II.A; see also Grady, supra note 34, at 671-72 (“When courts conduct
cost-benefit analysis of alternative untaken precautions, the surplus on the movement up to
the efficient level allows the precaution to extend into a zone where the last part of it is
producing a deficit.”). 
145. See Grady, supra note 34, at 671-72.
146. See id. at 671 (“The lower the defendant’s actual level of precaution, the more social
surplus that exists from moving up to the efficient level.”). 
147. The result is a symmetrical penalty on errors on either side of due care. See Grady,
supra note 20, at 817-21, 819 fig.4, 820 fig.5. The counterbalancing may not be perfect under
real-world conditions where nonlinearities and lumpiness exist. 
148. See id. at 815-16 (“[A]s the injurer takes less precaution, he creates more opportunities
for the victim to show a breach of duty.”); id. at 818-21, 819 fig.4, 820 fig.5; see also id. at 801-
06, 802 fig.1.
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Suppose that the cricket club had constructed the optimal six-foot
fence. In that case, there would have been no way that a plaintiff
could identify an untaken precaution that would have been cost
justified and also would have stopped the ball in question. If incre-
mental increases beyond six feet are not cost justified, then it is im-
material that they would have stopped this accident. But when the
defendant fails to meet the standard of due care, the increment by
which she falls short effectively grants the plaintiff some added
running room to identify a precaution that meets the doctrinal
criteria. So by failing to construct any fence at all, the cricket club
(properly, in Grady’s view) leaves itself open to the lumpy precau-
tion that fits into the gap created by its own shortfall.149
As a final demonstration of how this approach works, consider an
actor who constructs a five-foot fence rather than the optimal six-
foot fence. Suppose two pedestrians are injured by cricket balls in
the same week; one of these balls exited the field at a height of just
under eight feet, as in the original example, and the second one
exited the field at a height of just over six feet. Under Grady’s
approach, the second plaintiff, but not the first plaintiff, could make
out a successful case. The first plaintiff would be unable to show an
untaken precaution that would have been cost justified and also
would have prevented this accident. Only an eight-foot fence would
have stopped this accident, but increasing the fence height from five
feet to eight feet is not cost justified on the figures given in Table 2.
It would cost $300 in construction costs but would save society only
$275 in accident costs.150 By building to five feet, the actor has
shielded herself from liability she would have faced had she built no
fence at all.
The second plaintiff, struck by a ball just over six feet in altitude,
would have more luck. Here, the cost of building the extra two feet
($200) compares favorably with the accident cost savings associated
with those extra two feet ($250);151 considered as a unit, the extra
149. See id. at 815-16; Grady, supra note 34, at 671 (“Whenever a plaintiff is allowed to add
a lump of untaken precaution to the defendant’s suboptimal care level, he can show that
marginal benefits exceed costs even when the lump extends somewhat beyond due care.”). 
150. This figure is obtained by adding the marginal benefit for each of the one-foot
increases ($175 + $75 + $25 = $275).
151. This figure is obtained by adding the marginal benefit for the two one-foot increases
($175 + $75 = $250). 
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two feet of fencing is cost justified. It may seem harsh to hit the
defendant with liability for an accident that the optimal fence would
not have stopped, but the defendant opened herself up to this result
by failing to build the optimal fence.
This approach is attractive, but it presents some conceptual and
doctrinal difficulties. As the examples above show, liability might
result, variously, from failing to build a six-foot, seven-foot, or even
eight-foot fence, depending on what kind of fence, if any, the de-
fendant actually built. Does this pattern mean that the due-care
standard floats about depending on what the defendant has actually
done or left undone? This is indeed what Grady proposes.152 His
framing of his cost-benefit test hews to the HBN philosophy but
allows what counts as “negligence” to become more or less demand-
ing depending on the defendant’s actual inputs.153 Disconcertingly,
however, this requires us to accept an understanding of due care
that appears to eschew marginal analysis154 and demand (at times)
unjustified incremental investments in safety.
There is an alternative way to characterize this approach. We
could see it as leaving due care in a fixed position (here, the optimal
six-foot fence) but adopting a looser and more instrumental under-
standing of the relationship between failure to take due care and
the imposition of liability. When the UUP approach makes the own-
er of an unfenced cricket field liable for the ball that an eight-foot
fence would have stopped, this is not due to any belief that due care
requires an eight-foot fence, or that fences are only available in
eight-foot increments. Instead, unifying the precaution and com-
paring it to what the defendant actually did is merely a neat trick
designed to make up for other incentive misalignments produced by
the negligence regime.155 On this reading, the UUP is a sort of
“harming while negligent plus” (HWNP) rule, where the “plus”
factor that produces liability is the plaintiff ’s ability to identify an
152. See Grady, supra note 20, at 814 (“This [cost-benefit approach] retains the concept of
legal causation of the P*-cutoff rule, but defines breach of duty in a manner altogether
different from the P*-comparison approach.”). 
153. See id. at 816 (“[T]he cost-benefit approach permits alternative proofs of breach of
duty, and the levels of untaken precaution available for the victim’s proof increase as the
injurer’s actual precaution decreases.”).
154. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
155. See generally Grady, supra note 20.
2412 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:2371
untaken precaution that is both cost effective and causally effec-
tive.156 As we will see, a conceptually similar HWNP approach can
be pursued in contexts in which the failure to exercise due care pro-
duces factual uncertainty about whether due care would have pre-
vented the harm in question.157
The UUP standard not only corrects for the distortive ledge effect
built into the negligence standard, but also economizes on infor-
mation. To determine liability, it is not necessary (nor especially
useful, nor generally even possible) to calculate the exact location of
the due-care line in the abstract.158 Instead, a court can simply look
at whether an untaken precaution exists that would have stopped
this accident and that would have also been cost effective on the
whole.159 Consistent with this point, we might understand due care
as a step good that, like a bridge, generates certain societal benefits
when (and only when) it is provided by defendants in full.160 These
156. The notion of “causally effective” that I have in mind here would include not just “but
for” causation but also standard notions of proximate cause that require that the accident
stem from a type of risk that is increased by the activity in question. The examples in the text
easily satisfy this standard, so it is not at issue. However, causation would fail on these
independent grounds if, for example, a cost-effective reduction in speed would have prevented
the accident not because of its effects on accident risks, but simply because it would have
caused the vehicle to be somewhere else when an exogenous risk (such as a tree randomly
falling) produced harm by coincidence. See Berry v. Sugar Notch Borough, 43 A. 240, 240 (Pa.
1899); see also Ariel Porat, Offsetting Risks, 106 MICH. L. REV. 243, 246-50 (2007); cf. Keating,
supra note 101, at 56 (explaining that enterprise liability is limited to “the ‘characteristic
risks’ of activities”).
157. See infra Part III.
158. See Grady, supra note 34, at 660 (discussing the “excessive information” that courts
would require to implement an approach based on optimal precaution levels). A related
problem is that there may exist no precaution that perfectly aligns with the optimal level of
precautionary expenditures, given that precautions are often chunky in nature and must be
supplied in particular quantities, if at all. Calculating the point where smooth cost-benefit
lines would hypothetically cross provides a technical answer that may have no real-world
counterpart—or one that might be too costly to uncover. See Gregory C. Keating, Reason-
ableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 311, 328-32 (1996) (rejecting
a “razor’s edge” interpretation of the Hand formula that would determine negligence based
on a penny’s difference in marginal costs and benefits).
159. See Grady, supra note 34, at 661 (“This same untaken-precaution approach also
reduces courts’ need for technical information because they no longer have to identify the
precautions that produce the global minimum of social cost; they need only examine the costs
and benefits of the precautions that the plaintiff has actually alleged that the defendant failed
to take.”). 
160. See also infra Part III.B.
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benefits, which include reduced information costs,161 entitle non-
negligent defendants to a safe harbor from liability for efficient
accidents.162 Because defendants who fall short need not be extended
this same immunity, tort law is free to shape their liability in the
way that will best achieve its objectives. The UUP approach appears
to fit the bill, exposing negligent defendants to a limited form of
strict liability163 in order to align their incentives and reduce the
costs of adjudication.
This approach might seem vulnerable to another criticism,
however: that it invites strategic behavior by actors when precau-
tions come in lumpy increments. The next Section takes up this
point, which is not unique to the UUP proposal but rather emerges
whenever actor-selected preventative measures enter into the lia-
bility assessment.
161. Attention to information costs can also help address another question that the UUP
approach raises: What untaken precautionary steps can be unified together as a single
“precaution” for purposes of the UUP analysis? As the fence example shows, the UUP binds
together two untaken increments: a cost-justified increment that is not causally connected to
the accident (first six feet) and a marginally unjustified increment that is causally connected
to the accident (last two feet). But surely this does not mean that a plaintiff can meld an
unrelated but serious shortfall of the defendant cricket club (such as its failure to maintain
the brakes on the club’s car) with some highly inefficient precaution that would have stopped
the plaintiff ’s accident (such as a thirty-foot-high fence) under the UUP approach. Instead,
the UUP approach calls for a logical unity that makes it appropriate to think of the two pieces
as a single precaution. This will be the case when the precautionary steps are so closely
related that it would typically be difficult or impossible to disentangle which subset was
responsible for the accident. Treating these entwined untaken steps as a unified precaution
economizes on information costs and underscores the information function that is performed
when an actor takes due care. Once the efficient steps have actually been taken, it is no longer
difficult to tell whether they were sufficient to prevent the accident. I thank Michael
Livermore and Mildred Robinson for pressing me on this point.
162. A safe harbor tends to produce convergence at the point of safety—no one gains from
going beyond what is necessary, but no one wants to be left outside and exposed to liability,
either. See Morse, supra note 84, at 1389-90 (noting this “two-way convergence”). That result
depends, however, on perfect information about the location of one’s conduct relative to the
standard, or, if that information is lacking, symmetrically arrayed consequences for
overshooting and undershooting. 
163. The UUP approach imposes strict liability to the extent that the defendant may be
held liable for some accidents that due care would not, in fact, have prevented. See supra
notes 142-46 and accompanying text. It is, however, a limited form of strict liability that
reaches only those accidents that qualifying untaken precautions would have prevented.
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C. Strategic Slicing
Suppose the precautions available to an actor in a given context
are not continuous in nature like fence heights, but instead involve
binary or lumpy choices about things like buying a new piece of
safety equipment or adding another employee.164 A focus on untaken
precautions measured relative to a defendant’s actual actions might
seem to allow defendants to strategically select precautions that fall
short of due care, yet not enough short of due care to leave room for
a cost-effective and causally effective untaken precaution, given the
chunks in which precautions must be taken.165 There are ways to
address this concern, albeit imperfectly.
At the outset, it is worth emphasizing that this issue arises only
in cases lacking a clear external standard that defines due care,
such as a statutorily required piece of safety equipment. If a life pre-
server is required on board, the fact that the defendant did some-
thing less, such as having a rope on board, will not shield her from
liability if the absence of the preserver caused the harm, regardless
of how the marginal analysis plays out between rope and preserver
or between preserver and doing nothing. The trickier cases are ones
in which the location of the due-care standard must be determined
based on a Hand formula analysis. Here, a comparison of different
possible precautions may be likely to take center stage.
Imagine that a defendant faces a situation similar to that pre-
sented in the famous Carroll Towing case and must decide whether
to hire a bargee who could intervene in the event a boat breaks loose
from its moorings.166 Suppose further that there are three possible
164. Even the fence height examples above assumed a certain degree of lumpiness, insofar
as noninteger fences were ruled out. See supra Part II.B.2. But it is easy to imagine far less
divisible precautions.
165. To keep the analysis as simple as possible for purposes of isolating the implications
of lumpiness, the discussion here focuses on scenarios in which precautions are open to only
one party, the potential injurer. Numerous other strategic possibilities arise from the
interactions between precautionary choices made by different parties. See, e.g., Dhammika
Dharmapala & Sandra A. Hoffmann, Bilateral Accidents with Intrinsically Interdependent
Costs of Precaution, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 239 (2005); Ehud Guttel, The (Hidden) Risk of
Opportunistic Precautions, 93 VA. L. REV. 1389 (2007); Alan J. Meese, The Externality of
Victim Care, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1201 (2001); Steven Shavell, Torts in Which Victim and
Injurer Act Sequentially, 26 J.L. & ECON. 589 (1983). The lumpiness and durability of
precautions can play important roles in these contexts as well.
166. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). The example in
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precautions: hiring a daytime bargee (Precaution A); hiring a night-
shift bargee (Precaution B); and hiring a full-time bargee who would
live on the boat and be on call around the clock (Precaution C).
Imagine our defendant chooses Precaution A, the daytime-only
bargee, and the accident occurs after hours, when the bargee is a-
shore. Precaution B, the night-shift bargee, or Precaution C, the
full-time bargee, would have stopped the accident from happening.
Suppose further that, starting from the baseline of a daytime-only
bargee, the marginal improvement associated with adding a night-
shift bargee would not justify the cost. Can a towing company that
hires the daytime bargee immunize itself against the claim that a
full-time bargee would have been cost justified, based on the demon-
stration that adding a night-shift bargee would not be cost justified?
Not necessarily. Although the towing company’s precautionary
choice might at first look precisely analogous to a cricket club’s
optimal fence, for which no further improvements would be efficient,
there may be indivisibilities or economies of scale associated with
paying for a full-time bargee who will live on the boat. Suppose the
costs and benefits look like the ones in Table 3.
Table 3. Bargee Precautions
Cost of Precaution Expected Benefit
A: Daytime Only 100 120
B: Night-Shift Only 100 85
C: Full-Time 180 205
D: A + B 200 205
In this case, hiring one person to be on call around the clock is
cheaper than hiring two shift workers to split the work. This makes
Precaution C, the full-time bargee, the optimal precaution—even
the text is a stylization of the actual facts in Carroll. In the case itself, the towing company
had hired a bargee, just not a very reliable one. See id. at 173-74 (noting that the bargee had
been absent from the barge without excuse for about twenty-one hours); see also Grady, supra
note 12, at 301 (noting that the slacking bargee is often viewed as the functional equivalent
of “not hiring a bargee in the first place (a fictional durable precaution that helps us un-
derstand the case in terms of the theory)”). 
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though it would be inefficient to add Precaution B to existing Pre-
caution A.
This example shows why it would be unworkable to use a defen-
dant’s actual conduct as the sole baseline from which to assess
whether there was an efficient untaken precaution that would have
stopped the harm from occurring. In any case involving indivisi-
bilities or economies of scale, the defendant could choose a partial
measure like Precaution A and be shielded from liability by the
unavailability or nonexistence of a Precaution B that, when added
to Precaution A, would meet the criteria of being both causally
effective and cost effective. But this result does not follow from the
UUP approach described above.167 The untaken precaution sufficient
to establish the negligence liability of the defendant might be either
a precaution that could be added to the defendant’s actual efforts or
a substitute precaution for the efforts that the defendant actually
undertook—but only if the upgrade is a cost-effective one.
Going back to the bargee precaution numbers in Table 3, we can
see that the defendant who has actually hired a daytime bargee will
be able to rebut any claim that she should have also hired a night-
shift bargee. Doing so would cost an extra $100 but save only $85 in
accident costs. This is so even though the total benefits of the two
shifts together (Precaution D) exceed their total costs. But the
plaintiff can nonetheless show that the defendant should have
substituted a better precaution (full-time bargee) for the precaution
she took (daytime bargee).
Substituting a full-time bargee for a daytime-only bargee is a
cost-justified move, and it would have stopped the accident in
question. Making the switch requires expending an extra $80 in
precaution costs but yields an extra $85 in expected benefits. Thus,
a proper analysis will compare what the defendant could have done
with what the defendant actually did to see if there is room for an
improvement that would have mattered in the case. The defendant
who actually hired a bargee for the day shift can indeed shield
herself from claims that she should have also hired a night-shift
worker, but not from claims that she should have undertaken a
167. See supra Part II.B.2.
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different approach from the outset: hiring a full-time live-aboard
worker.168
Lumpiness in precautions may make some kinds of strategizing
easier, however. David Gilo and Ehud Guttel focus on the possibil-
ity of strategically low activity levels: if installing a particular kind
of smokestack becomes cost justified only at a given production lev-
el, a factory might hold production below that threshold in order to
avoid having to incur the cost of the smokestack.169 Here, the de-
fendant is effectively choosing one precaution—curtailing her
activity level—in order to make another precaution prohibitively
expensive relative to its benefits when added to that earlier pre-
caution. But it is not as simple as it was in the bargee case to say
that the defendant should have replaced the precaution she selected
(suppressed activity) with a different one (smokestack) from the
get-go. Activity levels are generally not second-guessed at all in a
negligence regime, given the difficulty of a court determining wheth-
er a particular level of activity was or was not worthwhile for the
defendant.170 Saying that a defendant should have done a given
168. This conclusion is sensitive to the numbers used in the example. Suppose instead that
a change in labor laws causes the cost of a full-time worker to rise to $200, the same cost as
purchasing the two shifts in combination. Under the UUP approach, the barge owner who has
actually retained a day-shift worker would be shielded from liability because there would not
be any marginal improvement that could be made in that case. See The Kathryn B. Guinan,
176 F. 301, 301-02 (2d Cir. 1910) (upholding a judgment that a night watchman was not
required in addition to the day-shift scow master, albeit on grounds of custom). On the other
hand, the barge owner who has not retained any bargee would be held liable for nighttime as
well as daytime losses because a full-time bargee (or the combination of day-shift and night-
shift bargees) would, taken as a whole, be a cost-justified improvement over what she actually
did, which was nothing. See supra Table 3.
169. David Gilo & Ehud Guttel, Negligence and Insufficient Activity: The Missing Paradigm
in Torts, 108 MICH. L. REV. 277, 280-81 (2009) [hereinafter Gilo & Guttel, The Missing
Paradigm]. Gilo and Guttel argue that their claims are not limited to lumpy precautions, but
their theory seems to fit best with such precautions, which also form their primary examples.
Compare Mark Grady, Response, Another Theory of Insufficient Activity Levels, 108 MICH. L.
REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 30, 30-32 (2009), http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1064&context=mlr_fi [https://perma.cc/S76Y-7YQQ] (contending that Gilo and Guttel’s
theory depends upon lumpiness), with David Gilo & Ehud Guttel, Response, Insufficient
Activity and Tort Liability: A Rejoinder, 108 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 64, 65 (2009),
https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1061&
context=mlr_fi [https://perma.cc/J6DJ-DVTQ] (“[T]he cost of precaution need not be ‘lumpy’
for the insufficient activity result to materialize.”).
170. See, e.g., Gilo & Guttel, The Missing Paradigm, supra note 169, at 278-79. Usually,
this incapacity to effectively police activity levels translates into the concern that defendants
will select excessive activity levels. For example, a driver might make an unnecessary trip to
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activity more seems both hard to prove and at odds with usual no-
tions of autonomy.171
Similar issues arise with decisions that are distributed over time.
An actor may sink costs into precautions that are optimal under cur-
rent conditions but that are destined to soon become suboptimal.
Technological changes might make new precautions superior to ones
that were optimal when previously adopted, yet the marginal im-
provement might not repay the retrofit.172 Should the fact that the
precaution was optimal when selected be an effective rebuttal if
tacking on an upgrade later would not be cost justified? In these
cases, the costs of strategic behavior and the moral hazard of ig-
noring future trends must be weighed against the advantages of
encouraging people to undertake precautions optimal for the con-
ditions they presently confront. That the law can always step in
with regulatory solutions173 mitigates these concerns to some degree
a store for a frivolous reason, when doing so carries trivial value for her compared to the risk
that she generates for others even if she is careful. See Shavell, supra note 55, at 26. Because
courts are ill-positioned to determine whether a given trip was valuable or valueless, see id.
at 25, the driver gets the benefit of the negligence regime’s safe harbor regardless. The fact
that drivers may be unable to avoid occasional lapses from the standard of due care tends to
buffer this effect, however, as does the widespread use of insurance that may be better able
to meter and price activity level risks. See supra Part I.
171. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Response, Insufficient Analysis of Insufficient Activity, 108
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 24, 26-28 (2009), http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/view
content.cgi?article=1065&context=mlr_fi [https://perma.cc/4AR3-BG3G]. To be sure, regula-
tory solutions can get at this issue from a different direction, arguably with just as much in-
terference with autonomy, although framed less controversially. See id. at 26-27 (noting the
importance of “optics”). For example, the government could simply mandate a smokestack for
widget production operations, and those operators who could not cover its cost at their current
production levels would be forced to either increase production or go out of business. See Gilo
& Guttel, The Missing Paradigm, supra note 169, at 311.
172. For example, suppose a defendant used a certain type of glass that was state of the
art at the time of its installation, T1. Later, at T2, an improved type of safety glass is invented
that offers a better overall ratio of benefits to costs. Even though choosing the original type
of glass would amount to negligence if undertaken at T2, it is possible that the cost of
upgrading from the current type of glass would not be worth the marginal improvement that
would be derived from doing so. Cf. Trimarco v. Klein, 436 N.E.2d 502, 506 (N.Y. 1982) (“[I]t
was ... for the jury to decide whether, at the point in time when the accident occurred, the
modest cost and ready availability of safety glass and the dynamics of the growing custom to
use it for shower enclosures had transformed what once may have been considered a
reasonably safe part of the apartment into one which, in the light of later developments, no
longer could be so regarded.”).
173. See Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Luigi Alberto Franzoni, Innovative Negligence Rules,
16 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 333, 338 (2014) (discussing the possibility that old technologies might
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by giving actors an incentive to guess correctly about unfolding
conditions.
Allowing defendants to capitalize on marginal analysis to dodge
liability when, and only when, they have actually taken the inter-
mediate precautionary step forecloses other sorts of opportunism.
Consider the much-studied case of Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel.174 Un-
der applicable law, the motel was required to provide either a life-
guard at its pool or a “statutory substitute”: a sign warning that no
lifeguard was on duty.175 Plaintiff ’s decedents were a father and his
young son who went into the pool without knowing how to swim,
and drowned.176 There was no lifeguard present and no sign posted
about the absence of a lifeguard.177 The defendants prevailed at
trial, but the California Supreme Court reversed and remanded for
a new trial, holding that once the defendant’s negligent noncom-
pliance was established, the burden shifted to the defendant to show
that the lack of a lifeguard was not a proximate cause of the
deaths.178
Although academic treatments disagree about which of the
alternative precautions (if either) constituted optimal care,179 one
way of understanding the case is illustrated by the numbers in
Table 4.
be prohibited by law, making their use negligence per se).
174. 478 P.2d 465 (Cal. 1970).
175. See id. at 470-72, 470 n.8.
176. See id. at 466-67.
177. Id. at 467-68.
178. See id. at 470. 
179. Compare Grady, supra note 20, at 822 (stating that the sign has “at least a plausible
claim” to be the optimal care level, especially given the cost of retaining a lifeguard during the
off-season, when the accident occurred), with Wright, supra note 20, at 88 (suggesting that
the lifeguard was viewed as the optimal precaution, with the statute allowing the sign, if
posted, to support an assumption of risk defense). Levmore’s “recurring misses” analysis
treats the failure to post the sign as the relevant failure. See Saul Levmore, Probabilistic Re-
coveries, Restitution, and Recurring Wrongs, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 691, 705-10 (1990).
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Table 4. Swimming Pool Precautions
Cost of Precaution Expected Benefit
Sign Only 100 120
Lifeguard Only 500 510
Assume that both the sign and the lifeguard are lumpy on-off
choices, and that it is only sensible to do one or the other, not
both.180 Even though both precautions “pay for themselves” in that
total benefits exceed total costs, the sign is the optimal precaution
on the numbers given. This can be demonstrated by considering an
“upgrade” from the sign to the lifeguard. It would cost an extra $400
but would produce only an extra $390 in benefits. Thus, a defendant
who had posted the sign would have no difficulty showing that it
was not negligent to stop there—even if there were no statute on the
books to back up her choice. But a defendant who had not taken
either of the precautions would have no such defense. The plaintiff
could show that the lifeguard would have been a cost-justified pre-
caution compared to what the defendant actually did since an “up-
grade” from doing nothing entails benefits of $510 and costs of only
$500.
The rationale for this approach, and the strategic possibilities
that it avoids, become clearer if we imagine a variation on the Haft
facts. Suppose there were two equally cost-effective ways of meeting
the due-care standard181: providing a life buoy at poolside, and
making life jackets available for checkout at the motel desk. With
respect to any particular drowning, it might be clear that one
precaution would have been causally effective and the other would
not have been. For example, the person who drowned might have
been an unaccompanied nonswimmer who would have almost
certainly worn an available life jacket (based on well-documented
past behavior) but who did not have anyone on hand to throw him
a life buoy.182 If the motel takes neither precaution and a motel
180. Although it would be possible to hire a part-time lifeguard and post the sign for the
balance of the time, the fixed costs of hiring the lifeguard might make a full-time position the
only viable alternative.
181. I am indebted to Ariel Porat for raising this point. 
182. Or, conversely, a victim with a history of eschewing life jackets might have benefited
from a life buoy due to the presence of a nonswimming companion. 
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guest drowns, the motel should not be able to strategically specify
which of the two precautions it “would have” taken had it not been
negligent, so as to evade a showing of causation. The potential for
underdeterrence is clear if this were permitted, even though the
motel can meet the due-care standard by actually taking either of
the precautions.
The Haft court’s reasoning, and its ultimate bottom line, afford
more than one possible interpretation. It is almost (but not entirely)
certain that a posted sign would not have prevented the drown-
ings.183 It is also very likely that a lifeguard on the scene could have
saved the pair. If an HWN rule applies,184 the difference is academic.
But if the rule is HBN,185 one of two difficulties must be confronted.
One must either find a way to get past the slim odds that the sign
would have saved the decedents (fudging causation), or else find a
way to impose liability for the failure to provide a lifeguard (fudging
due care). Saul Levmore has focused on the former alternative
under the head of “recurring misses” since it is, after all, conceivable
that some rare individuals would be deterred by a sign from going
into an unattended swimming pool.186 But the second alternative fits
neatly into Grady’s analysis: liability attaches for falling far enough
short of due care to afford space for a cost-effective and causally
effective alternative—the lifeguard.187
Perhaps it is not really necessary to choose between these two al-
ternatives in understanding Haft. One might instead return to the
idea of a “harming while negligent plus” (HWNP) regime,188 where
the plus factor can be either the omission of a precaution that meets
causation and efficiency criteria when compared with the plaintiff’s
conduct, or the omission of the optimal precaution under circum-
stances where it might have made a difference. The next Part delves
further into this question of omitted precautions that might have,
but did not necessarily, cause harm. Here, we see how another form
of aggregation—actually or conceptually repeating the interac-
tion—sheds light on the evaluation of risk.
183. See Levmore, supra note 179, at 705 (putting the odds at about 10 percent). 
184. See supra Part II.B.
185. See supra Part II.B.
186. See Levmore, supra note 179, at 705-06.
187. See Grady, supra note 20, at 822-23 (discussing Haft in terms of his theory).
188. See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
2422 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:2371
III. REPEATING RISKS
The cricket fence example was atypical in that it permitted
certainty about whether a given accident would have been pre-
vented by a fence of a given height. In many scenarios, by contrast,
we know only that a given accident would have been prevented with
some probability if the actor were not negligent. To use one of
Cooter and Porat’s examples, suppose that the negligent heating of
a vat used to make hot chocolate causes a valve to crack and cause
harm.189 But there is only some positive probability that the crack
and resulting harm were caused by the defendant’s negligence; the
valve would crack a certain number of times when heated nonneg-
ligently.190 What to do in that case? One possibility is to charge the
accident to the defendant when the defendant was negligent if (and
only if ) it is more likely than not that the negligence caused the
harm.191
This is an answer, but it may not be a satisfying one if the same
accident-causing procedure will be negligently repeated over and
over, with the negligence causing and not causing accidents in
stable and predictable proportions.192 Figuring out what to do about
such probabilistic cases involves another form of evaluative aggre-
gation, one that asks what is the right set of accidents—or potential
accidents—to hold in mind in assessing liability.
A. Compounding and Offsetting
A standard move in the economic analysis of tort law is to create
a kind of conceptual population explosion to assess how a particular
approach will work when scaled up. Instead of looking just at the
189. See COOTER & PORAT, supra note 20, at 20.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 20-21.
192. Cf. David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law”
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 858 (1984) (“[T]he [preponderance-of-the-
evidence] rule is neither a rational nor a just means of resolving the systematic causal
indeterminacy presented by mass exposure cases involving defendants whose tortious conduct
has caused or will cause a statistically ascertainable increase in the incidence of a particular
disease.”).
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case at hand, where a defendant’s negligence might have caused the
plaintiff ’s injury (but probably did not), one hauls in a huge set of
replicating mirrors and imagines the same scenario playing out
again and again and again, hundreds or thousands of times.193
Mass-producing the interaction between plaintiff and defendant
generates large-number trials that make probabilistic risk more
tractable.194 Doing so also helps to identify and highlight systemic
effects that could not be observed in a one-off case.
Consider how this operation plays out in the vat example in-
troduced above. If the probability that the defendant’s negligence
was to blame for a cracked vat is always, say, 40 percent, a more-
likely-than-not standard will produce the phenomenon Levmore
has termed “recurring misses.”195 Out of one hundred repetitions of
the accident, forty will be caused by negligence, but none will be
charged to the defendant.196 This can produce an insufficient degree
of deterrence.197 The opposite problem, which we might call “re-
lentless hits,” occurs if the probability that negligence was to blame
is always, say, 60 percent.198 Here, the defendant is always charged
with the accident even though her negligence was not to blame in
forty of the one hundred cases. This produces a cliff effect similar to
the one discussed above, which again puts increased pressure on
reaching the due-care standard.199
The cracked vat example goes to uncertainty about the causal role
of negligence, where it is clear that the defendant’s acts (hot
193. In some cases, such as mass toxic exposure cases, this exercise of imagination is not
necessary—the interaction has already been mass-produced in reality. See generally id.
194. It also subtly changes the framing of the risk being produced. Where an individual
interaction might generate merely a risk of harm to a given individual, the replication of this
interaction enough times produces the certainty of harm to a roughly determinate number of
(unspecified) individuals. As Barbara Fried has recently argued, we cannot categorically
equate such statistical risk creation with the creation of certain harm on a given occasion (for
to do so would rule out everything, no matter how low the risk, if it were repeated enough
times), nor can we simply ignore the risk in all cases, but rather must take into account the
level of risk. Barbara H. Fried, Facing up to Risk 17-19 (Stanford Pub. Law, Working Paper
No. 2850587, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2850587 [https://perma.cc/QQ8M-HE2N].
195. See Levmore, supra note 179, at 705-10. 
196. See id. at 705-06.
197. See id. at 706.
198. See COOTER & PORAT, supra note 20, at 20-22; see also Ariel Porat, Misalignments in
Tort Law, 121 YALE L.J. 82, 109-12 (2011). 
199. See COOTER & PORAT, supra note 20, at 20-22; see also supra Part II.B.
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chocolate making and associated vat-heating) caused the harm.
Causal uncertainty can also run to whether a particular defendant’s
acts caused the plaintiff ’s harm at all.200 Whether causal uncer-
tainty relates to the causal effect of the defendant’s negligence spe-
cifically or of the defendant’s acts more generally, a crucial question
is whether replicating interactions like the one in question will tend
to produce compounding or offsetting errors. As a first cut, we must
consider what is meant by “interactions like the one in question.”
Obviously, if the interaction before us involves a 40 percent prob-
ability of a causal connection, repeating that exact same scenario
hundreds of times will compound the error and produce a 40 percent
error rate if we stick with a preponderance-of-the-evidence stan-
dard. So we cannot quite mean that.
The question, rather, is whether the scenario before us, with its
particular level of causal uncertainty, is representative of the kinds
of cases that we would expect to see replicated over time. Is there
something about the vat apparatus (such as a stable background
failure rate when heated properly) that will always make it 40 per-
cent likely that the negligently rapid heating is what caused the vat
to crack?201 Or, instead, should we expect that the kinds of interac-
tions that defendants and plaintiffs like the ones before us will have
over time will tend to occupy a broad spectrum of probabilities? In
many settings, we might expect the errors introduced by a rote
application of the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard to rough-
ly offset, with the 40 percent cases that generate no liability coun-
terbalanced by the 60 percent cases that generate liability. We may
accept some level of error in individual cases but become alarmed
when scaling up suggests a systematic pattern of either recurring
misses or relentless hits.202
The significance of such systemic causal errors varies, depending
on whether we are talking about attribution errors that run to
negligence-causation or more broadly to act-causation. In the former
case, relentless hits merely amount to a pocket of strict liability, as
200. See infra Part III.C.
201. Levmore makes this point about the facts in Haft. See Levmore, supra note 179, at 706
(“The background statistics on such matters as drowning and the efficacy of lifeguards and
signs are sufficiently stable to ensure that the preponderance rule will systematically ‘miss’
ongoing instances of antisocial behavior that it should deter.”). 
202. See, e.g., id. at 705-06.
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will be discussed below, and recurring misses are relatively unprob-
lematic to reach without introducing serious distortions. Systematic
problems with act-causation, although occurring in relatively few
domains,203 present the more troubling specter of holding defendants
liable when their acts were not causative at all or, alternatively,
letting defendants systematically off the hook when they did cause,
on average, a certain quantum of harm. Various alternatives have
been tried or proposed to reach these issues, including prorating
damages to account for uncertainty or shifting the burden of
proof.204 Unsurprisingly, none of these approaches is fully satisfac-
tory. There is a fundamental tension between the scaling up that is
necessary to clearly see (and potentially solve) these problems and
the one-to-one pairing of wrongs and injuries that animates tort
law.205
An especially compelling variation of this basic problem is
illustrated by Jonathan Cohen’s “paradox of the gatecrasher,” in
which 1000 people are seated in a rodeo arena but only 499 have
paid the admission fee—and it is impossible to tell which ones.206
Under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, each person at the
rodeo (and hence every person at the rodeo) could be ejected or sued
for the admission fee, since it is more likely than not in each case
that the person is a gate-crasher rather than a paying customer.207
203. In some cases, the uncertainty is due to a high background risk given by nature, which
may be either episodically high (persons overboard on rough seas) or persistently high
(persons being treated for late-stage cancers). In other cases, it is clear that harm was caused
by some defendant, but there is uncertainty about which one (cases of market share liability
or alternative liability). See infra Part III.C.
204. See, e.g., Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 3-5 (Cal. 1948) (shifting the burden of proof in
an alternative-liability scenario, where both defendants were negligent but only one could
have caused the harm); Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 486-87
(Wash. 1983) (Pearson, J., concurring) (detailing a damage-prorating approach based on
reduced chance of survival, drawing on analysis in Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation,
and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Conse-
quences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353 (1981)). For a survey of possible approaches to recurring misses,
see Levmore, supra note 179, at 706-10.
205. See infra Part III.C.
206. L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 75 (1977). This problem has
generated an extensive academic literature. See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 179, at 694-95, 695
n.6 (discussing this scenario and citing prior literature on it). 
207. See COHEN, supra note 206, at 75. To be sure, a no-liability result could be premised
here on the promoter’s contribution to the information shortfall—its failure to come up with
an appropriate system of ticketing or stamping hands to distinguish paying guests from gate-
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Here, multiplication of uncertainty generates a manifestly absurd
level of injustice, yet it is no different in kind from that which can
and indeed must occur in the individual close case.208 The difference
is that the act of multiplication enables us to see a larger slice of the
world and observe its systematic skew.
That still does not quite explain why what is tolerable in the sin-
gle case may be intolerable in the aggregate. An economic explana-
tion would be that as long as cases generally wash out over time,
incentives will be in at least rough alignment, and we can do no bet-
ter than stick with the preponderance-of-the-evidence test.209 On
this account, close cases are tolerated on the assumption that there
is no systematic skew overcharging or undercharging defendants.
When the curtain is pulled back to show that such a skew exists
(within some identifiable corner), it becomes plain that our hope for
mistakes to wash each other out is unfounded.
Yet why stop with this rodeo when setting the bounds for ac-
ceptable error cancellation? Suppose there is another rodeo arena
across town, run by the same inept promoters, that is simultane-
ously seating 1000 persons, 501 of whom bought tickets, and 499 of
whom are gate-crashers. Here, recovery would be impossible against
any of the rodeo-goers on a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard,
even though nearly half are gate-crashers. The errors cancel if we
consider the rodeos together, but we hardly feel better. The promot-
ers recover the right amount, but not from the right people. Repeat
this pair of rodeos hundreds of times and gate-crashers find them-
selves getting ejected regularly, but paying customers are ejected
almost as often.
crashers. See Levmore, supra note 179, at 694-95. The analysis in the text assumes that no
such precautions were available, which might require positing some additional facts such as
excellent ticket counterfeiting by the gate-crashers or unexpectedly disappearing ink for
handstamps. 
208. See COHEN, supra note 206, at 75-76. A possible response might be that facts tend to
cluster in a relatively lumpy fashion, making hairline close cases a rarity, with most fact
patterns yielding answers far above or below the 50 percent mark. Cf. Bovik, supra note 28,
at 41 fig.4 (providing image histograms used in thresholding to illustrate the difference
between “[w]ell-separated modes” and “[p]oorly separated or indistinct modes” with respect
to gray levels). However, the tried cases may tend to cluster closer to the 50 percent mark,
regardless of the overall distribution, due to selection effects. See generally George L. Priest
& Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
209. See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 179, at 693-98.
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Perhaps what makes the aggregate case more viscerally problem-
atic than the individual case is simply that aggregation changes the
unit of analysis when we begin to examine mistakes. In an indi-
vidual one-off, we have someone who is (in the fact-finder’s eyes)
partly at fault and partly not; a binary decision in either direction
does not strike us as a severe miscarriage of justice (in a civil case,
anyway) if for no other reason than we can do no better. Scaling up
changes what was a probabilistic assessment about an individual
to a social judgment that is 100 percent wrong as to an identifiable
number of actual people (even if we cannot say which ones). With an
individual in a close case, we doubt a mistake is being made at all;
we think anyway it is less likely than not. With a crowd, we are cer-
tain that mistakes are being made, and being made at the whole-
person level for a number of identifiable individuals.210
There is at least one setting, however, in which we can formulate
a relatively nondistortive approach to causal uncertainty: the case
in which act-causation is clear but the causal role of negligence is
not. The next Section explains how understanding due care as a
step good helps to resolve the difficulties surrounding negligence-
causation.
B. The Bridge of Due Care
Consider again the case of the negligently heated hot chocolate
and the cracked vat, where it is 40 percent likely that the negligence
caused the crack and resulting damage. If we take a “harming
because negligent” (HBN) approach and require preponderance of
the evidence, the negligent chocolatiers escape liability. And if we
repeat the experiment a hundred times, they would escape liability
every time, while their negligence would have without doubt caused
forty of the cases of harm. It seems as if we must choose between
letting them get away with negligence repeatedly and adjusting the
required causal relationship.
A “harming while negligent” (HWN) standard escapes these vex-
ing difficulties because it loosens the fixation on whether negligence
caused a particular harm and asks instead whether negligence was
210. Cf. Fried, supra note 194 (discussing how risk translates into statistical certainty of
harm when scaled up).
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present and the act caused the harm.211 It is worth reconsidering the
doctrinal and normative objections to this approach, to see whether
they hold water. Here we might again consider viewing the negli-
gence rule not as defining the outer limits of liability, but rather as
setting out a safe harbor for which a defendant can qualify only if
she fully meets the standard of due care.212 As suggested above, this
recasting would treat due care as a kind of lumpy or step good that
must be supplied in full in order to deliver its liability-constraining
benefits to the actor.
One rationale for treating due care as a step good is that it has
certain public good characteristics that are realized only when it is
supplied in full. When an actor satisfies the due-care standard, not
only are the costs of accidents (including prevention costs) mini-
mized, society is saved the trouble of having to figure out whether
her shortfall (as opposed to her act in general) was causally re-
sponsible when harm results. In short, the actor is delivering an
information-cost benefit to society by fully meeting the due-care
standard.213 The reward for providing this benefit is that she will be
immune from liability even though her acts in the world will con-
tinue to generate accidents, albeit efficient ones. On this view, the
law truncates an actor’s liability once she meets the standard of due
care not because of any normative principle that people are entitled
to freely externalize all harms that due care would not prevent, but
rather because she has qualified herself for special treatment by
supplying the valuable lumpy good of due care.
There are at least two drawbacks to this approach. First, it may
be difficult for actors to know when the due-care standard has been
met, especially when it does not correspond to any obvious disconti-
nuity in the world. Keeping a vat of chocolate below the boiling
point is one thing, but making sure that heating occurs at a certain
speed or with a certain frequency of monitoring is another.214
211. See supra Part II.B.1.
212. See supra Part II.B.2.
213. For a recent discussion of the role of information costs in tort law, see generally
Jennifer Arlen, Economics of Tort Law, in 2 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
41 (Francesco Parisi ed., 2017).
214. See COOTER & PORAT, supra note 20, at 17-20, 18 fig.1.1, 20 fig.1.2 (providing examples
involving “natural continuity” (a vat leak) and “natural discontinuity” (a boil that spoils the
batch)). 
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Second, and closely related, it is nearly impossible for actors to
avoid falling below due care now and then, and such lapses can lead
to large amounts of liability.215 These problems exist under any neg-
ligence standard, but they are sharpened under an HWN standard
because a moment’s lapse or a trivial miscalculation can expose an
otherwise careful defendant to unlimited liability for not just the
harm that was caused by her shortfall, but also for all the harm she
causes that could not have been prevented by due care.216
An intermediate position between HWN and HBN would assess
liability only when there is at least an appreciable chance that the
defendant’s negligence caused the harm in question. If it is obvious
that due care would have done nothing to stop the harm from oc-
curring, then recovery would not be available. This fits well with the
information-cost account above because fact-finding difficulties will
tend to cluster around cases where the defendant’s negligence could
have plausibly caused or not caused the accident, not the outlier
freak accidents that due care could not have done anything to
prevent. Such an “appreciable chance” approach in cases of causal
uncertainty could be coupled with the unified untaken precaution
approach (UUP) above to short-circuit many factual difficulties and
avoid the distortions that the “zero liability at due care” ledge would
otherwise produce.217 And it may be quite close to the approach
courts already take.
Consider the case of Maddocks v. Bennett, a 1969 Alaska Supreme
Court decision involving an alleged allergic reaction to a beauty
salon’s hair dye treatment.218 The manufacturer’s instructions for
the dye product specified use of a patch test twenty-four hours in
advance to screen for allergic reactions, but the patch test was omit-
ted.219 The plaintiff first began remarking symptoms of itching and
fatigue about twenty-nine hours after the dye treatment (although
she also reported having felt unwell or “funny” for much of that
day).220 The symptoms subsequently escalated: the plaintiff ’s eyes
215. See supra Part I. 
216. See supra Part II.B.1.
217. See supra Part II.B.2.
218. 456 P.2d 453 (Alaska 1969).
219. Id. at 454.
220. Id. at 461.
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swelled, her scalp itched and burned, and all of her hair fell out.221
The defendant conceded that failure to perform the patch test
twenty-four hours in advance was negligent, but disputed that a
properly administered patch test would have revealed an allergic
reaction in time to stop the planned dye treatment.222
The court held that the plaintiff bore the burden of “show[ing] the
truth of the following statement: if the patch test had been given,
results would have occurred within the 24 hour waiting period
indicating an allergic reaction.”223 The court did not deem the de-
layed emergence of symptoms (twenty-nine hours after the treat-
ment) dispositive since had a patch test been given, it would have
been on a different and more sensitive area of skin, and there would
have been active monitoring for—as opposed to passive noticing
of—any allergic reactions.224 The court concluded that “[b]ecause a
reasonable person could conclude that more likely than not the test
would have shown some indication of an allergic reaction, appellee
did establish cause in fact sufficiently to take the case to the jury.”225
While this outcome nominally heeds both the allocation of burden
of proof to the plaintiff and the use of the more-likely-than-not
standard for cause in fact, sending the case to the jury is very likely
(given hindsight bias, a clearly negligent defendant, and a clearly
harmed plaintiff) to yield a recovery under circumstances where the
patch test could have made a difference.
Contrast this case with Peterson v. Nielsen, a 1959 Utah Supreme
Court decision involving a highway accident.226 In that case, the
defendant was clearly negligent for pulling out in front of the
plaintiff as she traveled on an arterial highway, and the only
question was whether the plaintiff ’s speed (which was somewhat in
excess of the legal limit) was a contributing factor that would bar
her recovery.227 The court answered this question in the negative
because it found that she could not have avoided the accident had
221. See id. at 454.
222. See id. at 459.
223. Id. at 460.
224. See id. at 460-61.
225. Id. at 461. 
226. 343 P.2d 731 (Utah 1959); see also Wright, supra note 20, at 86-87 (discussing this
case).
227. Peterson, 343 P.2d at 732-33.
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she been traveling at the legal speed: “In the instant case, any
reasonable analysis of the specific findings as to speeds and
distances, and the facts necessarily incident to them, will show that
the plaintiff could not have avoided the accident by exercising due
care.”228 After carefully reviewing the evidence on skidmarks and
distances, the court concluded that “she would have collided with
him had she been traveling at the lawful speed, or even at a
considerably lesser one.”229
What this pair of cases suggests is this: where an actor was
negligent and that negligence could have had no effect on the
accident that occurred, there will be no liability; but when it is an
open question whether the negligence could have mattered, that
may be enough to get to the jury.230 Ruling out instances in which an
actor’s negligence could have had no impact softens the cliff effect
of a pure HWN standard, without creating the distortions and
information-cost issues of a pure HBN standard.231 Imposing lia-
bility when the actor was negligent, caused harm, and the negli-
gence might have mattered thus constitutes another flavor of a
“harming while negligent plus” (HWNP) approach.232 Here, the plus
factor is an epistemically difficult to reach but factually plausible
228. Id. at 733.
229. Id. at 734. Wright presents this case as a rebuttal of Grady’s claim that courts will
impose liability when a cost-effective and causally effective precaution has been identified,
relative to what the actor actually did. See Wright, supra note 20, at 86-87. In fact, it does not
appear that any such precaution was ever identified in the case. No slower speed was named
that would have stopped the accident, so there was no analysis about whether dropping to
that speed would have had benefits in excess of costs when considered as a unit from the
baseline representing the driver’s actual speed. Even if this had been shown, however, the
existence of a statutory speed limit might well have afforded a safe harbor to the actor if it
were clear that the harm would have occurred even at that speed. This example shows why
it matters whether we understand the UUP approach to be actually shifting the due-care line
(a move that becomes unavailable when an external standard for due care exists) or instead
altering the causation requirement associated with a fixed due-care line (which could be
doctrinally combined with a fixed due-care standard such as a speed limit). See supra text
accompanying notes 152-56.
230. Wex Malone made a similar observation over sixty years ago in the context of omitted
fire safety measures. Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 78
(1956) (“[W]hen the defendant is unable to make a positive showing that a compliance with
the law would have been futile under the circumstances, and where the matter is fairly open
to speculation, the issue of cause almost always reaches the jury.”).
231. See supra Part II.B.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 156-57.
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causal relationship between the negligent increment of the actor’s
conduct and the harm that resulted.233
A discontinuity in liability remains under this approach, insofar
as a defendant can be liable for more than what her negligence
actually (more likely than not) caused. But this discontinuity is au-
tomatically softened in another way: the closer one is to due care,
the fewer one’s expected accident costs will be because the frequency
and severity of accidents will in fact be reduced as one approaches
due care. Contrast this result with the cliff effect that the law might
construct in a criminal or regulatory context, in which being only
one hairsbreadth over a given legal limit or one hairsbreadth be-
neath the applicable standard could yield results that are just as
severe as being quite far over the line or below the standard.234 In
tort, one is not held liable merely for generating undue risk; one
must also actually cause harm.235 Thus, one gains an expected ben-
efit by coming nearer to due care than by remaining further from
due care by virtue of the effects one produces in the world.
These gains are concretely experienced only by those engaged in
a great deal of repeat play—or those who have access to insurance
that creates similar results—because only through the law of large
numbers will actual accident costs come to approximate expected
accident costs. For most people, accidents are infrequent, lumpy
events. The theoretical ability to reduce accident costs through
close-to-optimal care will be of little comfort to someone who has the
misfortune of having a minor miscalculation or momentary lapse
generate catastrophic loss.236 But it must again be emphasized that
233. Such information concerns appear to have driven the analysis in Zuchowicz v. United
States, 140 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1998). In that case, a patient was negligently prescribed an
overdose of a drug. Id. at 384. There was strong evidence that the drug caused the patient’s
injury, but it was much less clear that the drug overdose (that is, the defendant’s negligence)
was specifically responsible. Id. at 390-91. This epistemic gap, Judge Calabresi concluded, did
not preclude a finding of liability:
[W]hen a negative side effect is demonstrated to be the result of a drug, and the
drug was wrongly prescribed in an unapproved and excessive dosage (i.e. a
strong causal link has been shown), the plaintiff who is injured has generally
shown enough to permit the finder of fact to conclude that the excessive dosage
was a substantial factor in producing the harm.
Id. at 391.
234. See supra Part II.B; infra Part IV.C.
235. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 20, at 67.
236. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss, in PHILOSOPH-
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this potential result is already a feature of the tort system as we
know it and would exist even under an HBN regime with very de-
manding causation requirements.237 Addressing that larger issue
brings us full circle to questions of aggregation in evaluating con-
duct—the place we began in studying lapses.
C. Matching Up Accidents
I have deferred until now the most difficult type of causation
problem: the one that arises when it is unclear whether the defen-
dant’s risk-generating acts caused the harm at all. This question of
act-causation presents issues distinct from those raised above,
where it was certain that the defendant’s acts caused the harm and
the only question was whether her negligence did so. Act-causation
emerges as a problem when the background risk given by nature or
produced by the acts of other parties make it difficult to attribute
causal responsibility to the defendant.238
The conceptual exercise of repetition has interesting effects here.
If the defendant was negligent, and we imagine her doing an act
over and over again with harm (of a sort that her negligence would
be expected to cause) repeatedly occurring, we might surmise that
she caused some of that harm, even if we do not know which specific
harms were her doing. Instead of asking whether she was more
likely than not to have caused each of the harms (a question that
will in some contexts give us a repeated negative answer), we should
ask: Which of these harms are most likely to be hers? If we could
see the full universe of possibly caused harms, and we also knew
roughly the amount of harm the defendant was responsible for, we
could look for features that would tip us off as to which ones were
more likely than the others to have been the fault of this defendant.
ICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 387 (David G. Owen ed., 1995). 
237. See id. at 398-401 (describing a scenario in which a defendant’s negligence clearly
caused the accident, but nonetheless generates an amount of liability that seems dispro-
portionate to the severity of the lapse). 
238. These problems tend to cluster around drownings, toxic exposures, and medical
misadventures—settings where background risk is high, other potential blame-bearers are
prevalent, or both. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 192, at 856-58 (noting these problems in
mass toxic exposure cases). 
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We plainly have no such capacity, yet the ordinary preponder-
ance-of-the-evidence standard can be understood in something like
these terms. By partitioning cases based on whether the harm was
more likely than not caused by the defendant (the usual focus of
our attention), the standard also automatically identifies which
defendant-harm pairings are more likely than other possible defen-
dant-harm pairings. If we wish to maintain an accident-centered
system, then we need a thresholding algorithm that will charge a
defendant with the amount of harm that she (statistically speaking)
caused. This happens automatically under a preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard when the strength of the causal connections
between harms and injurers are symmetrically arrayed around the
centerpoint.
In settings where causation will always be less likely than not,
yet the defendant is plainly responsible for some of the harm, a dif-
ferent approach is required. Proportional liability seems like a
logical response.239 But it fits uneasily within an accident-centric
system.240 What should we do, for example, when it is absolutely
clear that a particular defendant could not have caused this plain-
tiff ’s harm? The relentless application of a proportional liability rule
in this context means abandoning any semblance of a causation
requirement, but relaxing it risks distortions in the overall system
239. Under this approach, damages are prorated to factor in causal uncertainty. For
example, if a doctor’s negligence was 20 percent likely to have caused the plaintiff ’s death, the
plaintiff ’s estate would recover 20 percent of the amount of damages that would normally be
available in such a case. If repeated over time, the doctor would ultimately be liable for
amounts equaling 20 percent of the deaths, even though every plaintiff would recover in part
and no plaintiff would recover in full. See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 179, at 692, 697-98. A
different way of characterizing proportional liability is to redefine the harm as a “loss of a
chance” of survival—an approach that allows a court to retain a preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard. See, e.g., Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 832 (Mass. 2008). But
when the injury is defined in this way, conceptual consistency would seem to require opening
the courthouse doors to those who had suffered no tangible ill effects at all, if a doctor’s
negligence nonetheless made their survival less likely—a move that seems foundationally at
odds with an accident-based system. I thank Bert Huang for discussions on this point. 
240. Proportional liability is just one possible node along a spectrum of aggregative
approaches that would shift the focus from the individual accident to the systemic effects of
risk creation. For arguments in favor of aggregative “public law” mass tort adjudication
processes, see Rosenberg, supra note 192.
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of deterrence.241 An alternative would attempt to deliver incentives
by finding the relatively best defendant-harm pairings.
Here, instead of tort law’s more-likely-than-not inquiry, we would
ask a slightly different question: Is the strength of the causal con-
nection between the harm and the defendant in the case before the
court stronger or weaker than the average causal connection be-
tween defendants engaged in this type of activity and harms of this
type?242 If desired, the verbal formulation could be adjusted to re-
quire a larger gap between the average causal connection and the
liability-generating one. The point is a basic one: if we are trying to
match up defendants who cause harm with the harm that they
cause, it is the relative strength of the causal connection, and not its
absolute strength, that should matter. This corresponds to the in-
tuitive inquiry of whether there will be better opportunities than
this one to hold the defendant to account for her risk-generating
behavior.243
The answer to that question directs us to a type of bundling that
is implicit in the repetition exercise. Many kinds of precautions are
“durable” in that they cannot be readily tailored across situations
and conditions.244 For example, the preventative measure of putting
a life buoy on a boat before it goes out to sea cannot be altered
during the boat’s journey depending on factors that might bear on
its efficacy.245 The buoy on board in calm, predator-free waters is
bundled with the buoy on board in stormy, shark-infested waters.246
241. See, e.g., Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1076-78 (N.Y. 1989) (con-
sidering and rejecting exculpation in market-share liability litigation). 
242. This inquiry closely resembles one method of “adaptive thresholding” in image
manipulation. See Fisher et al., supra note 30 (illustrating how using “the mean of a 7×7
[pixel] neighborhood” as the local threshold generates much better results than applying a
global threshold where there is “a strong illumination gradient” in the image). 
243. The question of whether there is a better scenario or better plaintiff is a common one
in tort (and other) law and can explain a variety of doctrines. See, e.g., Levmore, supra note
179, at 705-10 (discussing the problem of “recurring misses,” which assumes a dearth of
opportunities to hold the defendant to account); Richard M. Re, Relative Standing, 102 GEO.
L.J. 1191 (2014) (discussing the advantages of a “most interested plaintiff ” standing rule over
an “adequacy-based approach”). 
244. See Mark F. Grady, Marginal Causation and Injurer Shirking, 7 J. TORT L. 1, 16-20
(2014) (discussing the significance of durability and divisibility in precautions).
245. See id. at 16-17 (using an example involving a life buoy and heterogeneity in
swimming ability to make this point).
246. Grady terms this a “victim-aggregating effect,” but a precaution need not actually
aggregate different victims as long as it aggregates a variety of possible accident scenarios
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Failing to supply the buoy generates a real risk of liability because
its absence in the calm, predator-free waters is very likely to make
a difference, even if it is unlikely to matter in the state of the world
where the swells are high and sharks circle. Here, the inability of
the defendant to choose precautions separately in the two states of
the world helps to preserve appropriate incentives.247 Often the buoy
would not have mattered, but we are able to easily pick out the
times when it was most likely to have mattered by using a more-
likely-than-not standard.
But suppose that a boat only plies stormy, sharky waters while
perpetually carrying a crew of terrible swimmers.248 It is possible
that leaving off the life buoy in this case is not actually Hand for-
mula negligent249 at all, but let us suppose that the buoy is so in-
expensive and occasionally so effective that it is negligent not to in-
clude it. Now we want to ask not whether it is more likely than not
that the missing buoy caused an overboard sailor’s death, but rather
whether this overboard sailor’s death was more likely (or, perhaps,
much more likely) to have been caused by the missing life buoy than
the typical such overboard sailor’s death occurring under the con-
ditions in which the boat regularly operates.
A more straightforward example appears in medical contexts that
are characterized by a high background risk of death.250 Here too, we
want to identify the harms that were the most likely ones, among
those occurring in this specialized high-risk setting, to have been
caused by a doctor’s error. That might be done by lowering the lia-
bility threshold to something close to the average causal connection
involving different amounts of background risk and hence different degrees of precaution
efficacy. See id. at 26. 
247. See id. at 16-20. The implicit bundling associated with durable precautions is not
always beneficial, however. For example, it might dictate carrying a bulky piece of safety
equipment that is not cost justified most of the time and only gets in the way of the crew, but
is so useful on rare occasions that it is cost justified overall. In such a case, the equipment can
be analogized to a cricket fence that is only available in a height that exceeds the optimum.
Conversely, a given precaution might be extremely efficacious under certain rare circum-
stances, but because these circumstances are so rare, the precaution is not cost justified
overall and will not be provided—even though it would be worthwhile to provide if it could
be selectively conjured up just in the states of the world where it is useful.
248. Cf. id. at 19 (presenting a hypothetical in which a boat owner can strategically tailor
the provision of a life preserver to the swimming abilities of the boat’s crew).
249. See supra note 16.
250. See, e.g., Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983).
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between a doctor’s negligence and negative medical outcomes. If a
doctor’s negligence would, if repeated, cause death in twenty cases
out of one hundred, a court might ask whether, in the case before it,
the causal connection between the defendant’s negligence and the
plaintiff ’s harm exceeds (or, perhaps, significantly or greatly ex-
ceeds) the baseline causal connection of 20 percent.
We might worry that making doctrinal adjustments like this one
will deter people from entering fields that involve high background
risk, such as medical specialties where survival chances are chron-
ically low.251 The concern is compounded if we also think that these
same fields involve a high risk of lapses, relative to other fields. This
is similar to the worry that people will underutilize valuable tech-
nologies if they generate many opportunities for human lapses, even
if they increase overall safety or survival chances.252 The answer to
all these points is essentially the same: we may wish to subsidize
people who enter certain fields or use certain technologies to ac-
count for the overall beneficial effects of these choices on social wel-
fare.253 What we want to leave in place, however, are incentives for
people to take appropriate levels of care at the margin.
If we wish to deliver incentives through a tort system that makes
binary judgments at the accident level (an open question), we will
at times need to settle for a rough and functional understanding of
causation. Just as the thresholds for converting grayscale pixels to
black and white may need to be adjusted within portions of an
image to compensate for the effects of light and shadow,254 we may
need to alter the relevant thresholds for assigning liability under
certain background conditions. Scaling up the interactions can help
us see how and why to make these adjustments.
IV. EXTENSIONS AND CONNECTIONS
The analysis above has demonstrated how aggregation choices,
often made without reflection or comment, can decisively shape tort
251. See Cooter & Porat, supra note 7, at 348-50.
252. See Grady, supra note 12, at 297 (giving the example of a dialysis machine, which
reduced the overall risk of death but also increased the opportunities for humans to make
liability-generating compliance errors). 
253. See Shavell, supra note 55, at 37-39. 
254. See Fisher et al., supra note 30. 
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liability and incentives. Although the particulars vary, similar
points can be made in other areas of law. In this last Part, I briefly
consider connections between the aggregation puzzles examined
here and some that arise in other doctrinal areas. These other legal
contexts offer useful points of comparison and the potential for
transferable lessons in both directions.
A. Setting the Viewfinder
The problems of evaluative aggregation examined here illustrate
a deep and important question that runs through all of law: How
wide or narrow should the evaluative viewfinder be? Sometimes
widening the frame to encompass a larger slice of behavior allows
evidence to pile up in support of a conclusion that could not be
reached, or could not be reached to a sufficient level of confidence,
based on a narrower window of observation. At other times, wid-
ening the frame enables other observations to dilute or offset the
ones initially isolated in the viewfinder. Conversely, a constriction
in the evaluative frame might remove either corroborating or mit-
igating evidence from view, or do some of each.
The lapse analysis thus shares common ground with questions
that arise in other evaluative contexts: Is the observation before us
typical or atypical, and could widening the frame provide a defini-
tive answer? The fact that law often determines liability based on
what amounts to a single draw from an otherwise opaque urn raises
questions about the feasibility and legitimacy of basing decisions
on more draws. A core normative question is whether it is appropri-
ate in a given context to, effectively, “tak[e] character evidence” in
this manner.255
Indeed, to even speak of behavior as a draw from an urn implies
that human beings constitute the same “urn” over time, and that
observations that form a pattern are not independent of each oth-
er.256 As a legal proposition, this is controversial. To the extent that
liability is meant to attach to a given act and not to one’s overall
urn-pattern, peering into the urn or plucking additional draws may
255. See Grady, supra note 10, at 402. 
256. This issue relates to larger philosophical questions about the durability of personal
identity. See, e.g., DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS (1984). 
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appear illegitimate—both beside the (legal) point and potentially
prejudicial.257 Yet in many contexts, people try to do exactly that,
and it is generally regarded as not only sensible but essentially
required. For example, it might seem rash to fail to obtain refer-
ences about a potential hire. Likewise, an employer who suspects an
employee of dishonesty might watch that employee closely to see if
corroborating or exonerating patterns appear.258 How we handle
lapses in tort law may bear on treatment of these other matters, and
vice versa.
B. Bundling and Strategizing
In tort law, as we have seen, the capacity to treat untaken
precautions as indivisible bundles may be functional at times. This
upends our usual affinity for marginal analysis. By allowing the
high social value of omitted efficient precautionary steps to absorb
the social waste associated with omitted inefficient precautionary
steps, the latter as well as the former can become a basis for lia-
bility when the two appear together in a single proffered untaken
precaution.259 This may seem unconventional, until we recognize
that legislative line-drawing, logrolling, and dealmaking of all sorts
very typically involve similar moves.
Elements that are inefficient or disadvantageous at the margin
are frequently allowed to cannibalize some of the surplus from the
elements that are worthwhile. The larger the excess of benefits over
costs for the worthwhile elements, the larger the flaws of the
unworthwhile elements may be without sinking the overall package.
In making an up-down assessment about a policy or program, total
costs and total benefits are typically compared—and because total
benefits can exceed total costs well beyond the stopping point
257. For an interesting exploration of this issue in a criminal law context, see Sean P.
Sullivan, Probative Inference from Phenomenal Coincidence: Demystifying the Doctrine of
Chances, 14 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 27 (2015) (discussing Rex v. Smith, 84 L.J.K.B. 2153
(1915), an infamous case involving a defendant’s alleged bathtub drowning of his wife, where
evidence surfaced that the defendant’s two other marriages had also ended with bathtub
drownings). 
258. See Schauer & Zeckhauser, supra note 78, at 28 (contrasting the “discrete event”
approach of criminal law with employment decisions in which patterns of conduct are often
deemed relevant). 
259. See supra Part II.B.2.
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indicated by marginal analysis, a plan that appears valuable overall
may include elements that erode rather than augment its value.
Deference to legislative judgments suggests that courts will rarely
question the precise position of a line or ask whether it could have
been drawn in a different way to advance a greater amount of social
value.260 Is this desirable or undesirable? Recall that the rationale
for unifying precautions in the tort context turned on the otherwise
asymmetric treatment of errors falling above and below due care.261
In the legislative or administrative realm, errors may involve doing
too much or doing too little. If we think that inaction or insufficient
action is systematically punished less severely than excessive ac-
tion, then there may be an analogous reason to accept bundling
that embeds some inefficient increments.262 We have seen that the
best defense against the proffer of a unified untaken precaution is
to take due care in the first place, or as near to due care as one can
get.263 Similarly, moving legislation or regulation toward the optimal
line offers protection against bundled deals that will trade on the
surplus of an untaken reform.264
The potential for strategic behavior also exists, however. As
new regulations move the baseline forward, this may effectively
constrain the size of the next available change that would satisfy
260. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388-89 (1926) (explain-
ing that laws are not invalid simply because their prohibitions “include individual cases that
may turn out to be innocuous in themselves”).
261. See supra Part II.B.
262. Of course, actions can move in a deregulatory direction as well as a regulatory one.
See, e.g., Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Judicial Role,
85 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 7), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2915063
[https://perma.cc/Y3HB-JRLM].
263. See supra Part II.B.
264. Getting as close as possible to optimality will help to immunize a legislative or
regulatory agenda both against excessive future moves in the same direction and against
repeals that move in the opposite direction. This is because there will be fewer moves in either
direction that would qualify as beneficial overall (to the extent that is required under cost-
benefit analysis or otherwise). Conversely, the further a legislature or agency overshoots
optimality by tacking on worthless elements that erode value, the more opportunities it
provides for a later repeal that removes not only the worthless elements but also some of the
valuable ones as well. Here, the gains from taking away worthless elements produce surplus
that can absorb some deficits produced by taking away valuable ones. Having courts directly
impose marginal analysis on both new measures and repeals could police excessive moves in
both directions, see generally Masur & Posner, supra note 262, although this would not
address inaction. 
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a cost-benefit analysis—especially if the steps in which regulators
must move are inherently chunky. Thus, incremental moves might
in some cases stymie rather than catalyze further moves.265 By ma-
nipulating the unit of analysis—unifying or subdividing moves—
the space between optimality on a marginal analysis and accepta-
bility on a cost-benefit analysis can be exploited or eliminated.
C. Consequential Line-Crossings
Aggregation choices can determine whether a particular actor has
crossed a legal line. Such choices become more important when cliff-
like consequences attach to line-crossing. Consider regulatory tak-
ings law, where the government’s liability turns on whether it has,
in the words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, gone “too far.”266
This inquiry often depends, at least in part, on how much of the
owner’s property was taken.267 How should a property owner’s hold-
ings be grouped together or broken apart in evaluating whether the
government has overreached?268 And what should the consequences
be if the government has, indeed, gone too far?
The first question requires a multifactor analysis, according to
the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Murr v. Wisconsin.269 The
doctrinal answer to the second question, however, seems relatively
straightforward: once a taking is found, the government must pay
for all that it has taken, not just the “too far” increment.270 This
265. However, incremental changes may also alter political coalitions in ways that increase
the likelihood of future changes. See generally Saul Levmore, Interest Groups and the Problem
with Incrementalism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 815 (2010). The capacity for early reforms to alter the
cost-benefit balance of future changes may offer a counterweight to these effects. 
266. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
267. Under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, a regulation that eliminates “all
economically beneficial use” will be a taking that requires just compensation unless “the
proscribed use interests were not part of [the owner’s] title to begin with.” 505 U.S. 1003, 1027
(1992). Under the multifactor Penn Central test that applies in most situations, the question
of how much was taken comes up in assessing the economic impact on the owner and the
degree of interference with the owner’s “distinct investment-backed expectations.” Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
268. This issue is familiar to property scholars as a “denominator problem” or an issue of
“conceptual severance.” See supra note 36 and accompanying text; infra notes 276-77. For fur-
ther discussion of aggregation and division in the context of regulatory takings, see Lee Anne
Fennell, Lumpy Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1955, 1972-75 (2012).
269. See 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1945-46 (2017).
270. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 748 (1997) (Scalia, J.,
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generates a formidable cliff effect.271 The approach is analogous to
an HWN rule in the tort realm, to the extent that the causal link
between the “too farness” and the harm to the landowner will not be
parsed or the effects partitioned.272 One way to eliminate the cliff of
liability would be to effectively “continuize” the government’s pay-
ment requirement and impose liability for all diminutions of val-
ue.273 Another tack would challenge the idea that the government is
fully liable for the landowner’s loss once its impositions cross the
line and amount to a regulatory taking.274
If we accept a cliff effect in the takings context but resist it in the
tort context, it is perhaps because we are more conscious of ledge
effects in the former setting, and of their pernicious effects on in-
centives. In the regulatory takings arena, the government enjoys a
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Whereas once there is a taking, the
Constitution requires just (i.e., full) compensation, a regulatory taking generally does not
occur so long as the land retains substantial (albeit not its full) value.” (citations omitted)).
Even if the government chooses to lift the regulation rather than pay for the taking, it is still
liable for the time slice during which the regulation was in force. First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987).
271. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8 (recognizing the potential for takings doctrine to
generate an “all-or-nothing” result in which “the landowner with 95% loss will get nothing,
while the landowner with total loss will recover in full”). The complexities of valuing property
for purposes of compensation can, however, soften this effect by altering what it means to
recover in full. See Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation
for Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 677, 692-94 (2005) (observing that preexisting
restrictions on the property are taken into account in determining its fair market value, and
that potential unenacted regulations may be considered as well).
272. See supra Part II.B.1. Causation can become relevant in some regulatory takings
cases. See, e.g., Lemmons v. United States, 496 F.2d 864, 875 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (holding that
recovery was unavailable where a permissible permit revocation caused the plaintiff’s loss,
not the alleged taking of the plaintiff ’s leasehold).
273. This view is most prominently associated with the work of Richard Epstein. See, e.g.,
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
(1985); see also KATZ, supra note 2, at 145-51 (discussing efforts to “continuize” different areas
of law). 
274. Some commentators have proposed valuation approaches that would effectively isolate
the “too far” portion for compensation. See Douglas W. Kmiec, Regulatory Takings: The
Supreme Court Runs out of Gas in San Diego, 57 IND. L.J. 45, 75 (1982) (advocating a “least
economically viable use value standard” for calculating permanent damages because it
“satisfies the constitutional minimum by supplying the value increment necessary to cure the
regulatory taking”); see also John J. Costonis, “Fair” Compensation and the Accommodation
Power: Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1021
(1975) (recommending a “Reasonable Beneficial Use standard” for measuring compensation
under an “accommodation power” theory).
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no-liability ledge right up until it has gone too far. If the govern-
ment had to pay only for the too-far increment, the argument would
run, it would err on the side of “too far” every time since it bears all
the costs of going less far but internalizes no monetary benefit from
its restraint (it pays zero, no matter how close to the “too far” line
it may be). Of course, there are some questionable assumptions built
into this line of reasoning, including issues of governmental respon-
siveness to payment obligations and political pressures.275 But this
core concern may nonetheless help explain the doctrine.
Alternatively, or in addition, perhaps there is a normative view
that when the government goes too far, this constitutes a unified,
indivisible act which cannot, or at least should not be, split into its
component “not too far” and “too far” pieces for settling up. The
unified untaken precaution approach embodies a similar judgment
by treating a defendant’s negligent omission and her nonnegligent
omission as a unified liability-generating event, at least when the
two share space within a cost-justified untaken precaution that
would have prevented the accident. Considered side by side, the
two contexts suggest the need for more explicit thinking about when
certain legal or factual events will be treated as divisible or in-
divisible.
Regardless of its rationale, the cliff effect in regulatory takings
analysis generates great pressure around the “too far” line. This
makes matters of aggregation paramount. Thus, courts and com-
mentators struggle with “the denominator problem”276 and its dis-
credited alter ego, “conceptual severance,”277 in attempting to define
275. See, e.g., Ronit Levine-Schnur & Gideon Parchomovsky, Is the Government Fiscally
Blind? An Empirical Examination of the Effect of the Compensation Requirement on Eminent-
Domain Exercises, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 437 (2016); Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay:
Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 414
(2000).
276. The denominator problem takes its name from the implicit fraction-construction
exercise that regulatory takings doctrine invites when it asks how severely the owner’s
property was burdened or whether “all economically beneficial use” was taken. See Lucas v.
S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992). To answer this question, we must define the
base against which the diminution of value can be measured. 
277. Margaret Jane Radin coined the term “conceptual severance” to denote an illegitimate
form of disaggregation that would define the property interest against which the government’s
incursion was made in terms of the regulatory incursion itself. See Margaret Jane Radin, The
Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 1667, 1674-78 (1988). Conceptual severance has been explicitly rejected by the
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the property interest against which the government’s acts will be
assessed. Widening the frame makes the government action appear
comparatively less burdensome and tightening it does the opposite,
producing opportunities for strategic behavior on both sides. Inter-
esting questions abound, including what kinds of offsetting effects
on the landowner should “count” in pulling the government action
back from the “too far” brink.278 These questions, although seem-
ingly far removed from the aggregative issues that arise in the tort
context, share common structural features that merit attention.
CONCLUSION
Tort law’s focal point, the accident, is a discrete lump in a stream
of risk-related behavior. At the same time, it represents a single
instantiation of an interaction that may ultimately be repeated
many times. The accident’s scale and its singularity do not align es-
pecially well with the deterrence tasks that tort law seeks to pursue
through the imposition of liability. This fact puts pressure on the
aggregation choices that are implicated in the law’s thresholding
operations—the up-down judgments made at the accident level,
which cumulatively shape the overall pattern of tort law.
I have focused here on three sets of aggregative choices: the
amount of behavior to examine, the way that precautionary steps
Supreme Court. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 331 (2002) (rejecting “[p]etitioners’ ‘conceptual severance’ argument” as inconsistent with
“the parcel as a whole” analysis in Penn Central (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978))). To rule out a circular definition of the property interest
does not, however, tell us how the relevant denominator should be defined. See STEVEN J.
EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS § 7-7(b)(2) (5th ed. 2016) (suggesting an opposite risk of
“conceptual agglomeration” in takings cases). 
278. The transferrable development rights (TDRs) bestowed on the landmarked properties
in the Penn Central case offer an interesting example of this question. Penn Cent. Transp. Co.
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The majority and dissent disagreed over whether these
TDRs should enter the analysis in determining whether a taking had occurred (that is,
whether they should be allowed to offset the negative impact of landmarking on the land-
owners) or whether they should be disregarded in that analysis and considered only as a form
of compensation that should be assessed for its constitutional adequacy. See id. at 149-52
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The controversy is an artifact of the cliff effect built into takings
doctrine, which raises the possibility that a governmental entity would try to pull back from
the brink of a taking by offering something much less than full compensation as an offset. See
Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 747-48 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
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are stacked together, and the conceptual replication of interactions
in the analysis of risk. These aggregation choices carry important
implications for tort law that have not been sufficiently recognized.
Viewing these core theoretical puzzles of tort law through the lens
of evaluative aggregation offers new insights on long-standing doc-
trinal questions as well as on emerging phenomena like autonomous
vehicles. The analysis here also sheds light on similar aggregation
issues that arise in other areas of law.
